Bombay High Court: While considering an application under Section 11, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) seeking appointment of a sole arbitrator in relation to disputes arising under a Jewellers Block Insurance Policy, a Single Judge Bench of Amit Borkar, J., allowed the appointment of arbitrator in the insurance dispute and held that repudiation of liability under insurance policy does not bar appointment of arbitrator at Section 11, Arbitration Act stage. Accordingly, the Court appointed a sole arbitrator while leaving arbitrability issues to the Tribunal. The Court observed that repudiation of liability, arbitrability of claims, accord and satisfaction, doctrine of election, limitation, and interpretation of the arbitration clause involved substantive and disputed questions which ought to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal and not by the referral court at the appointment stage.
Background
The applicant was engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting gold jewellery and had obtained a Jewellers Block Insurance Policy dated 14 January 2019, which covered various risks, including loss arising from fidelity or dishonest acts of persons to whom the jewellery or gold was entrusted. The applicant stated that the policy contained an arbitration clause, but the complete terms and conditions of the policy were not supplied to it and were only disclosed for the first time during the consumer proceedings. The applicant further alleged that the respondent manipulated the original policy and relied upon a different version without consent and procured a surveyor’s report.
The respondent repudiated the insurance claim by a letter dated 28 February 2020. The applicant then initiated proceedings before the District Consumer Commission. The Consumer Commission recorded findings regarding manipulation of policy documents, unfair trade practice, breach of regulatory requirements and wrongful repudiation, but observed that issues relating to quantification of actual loss, consequential damages and financial consequences could not be adjudicated within consumer proceedings. The applicant was granted the liberty to pursue arbitration under the insurance policy.
The applicant invoked arbitration by notice dated 20 February 2026 seeking adjudication of claims relating to loss of profits, loss arising from disruption of business for 81 months, working capital losses, replacement value of bullion, financial burden resulting from classification of the account as a non-performing asset, GST liabilities and other consequential damages. The respondent refused to concur in the appointment of an arbitrator on the ground that its appeal was pending before the State Consumer Commission, which resulted in the filing of the present application under Section 11, Arbitration Act.
The applicant contended that only questions of quantification and quantum of loss remained unresolved and that the Consumer Commission had expressly preserved the right to invoke arbitration under the policy. It was argued that the respondent itself had relied on the arbitration clause in earlier proceedings while asserting that disputes relating to quantum were arbitrable. On the other hand, the respondent argued that the arbitration clause provided that no dispute would be referred to arbitration where the company had denied its liability. It was further contended that where the company disclaimed liability and the claim was not made within 12 months from the date of such disclaimer, it would be treated as abandoned and would thereafter not be recoverable. The respondent stated that the District Consumer Commission’s order on which the applicant relied was under challenge before the State Consumer Commission, and that having elected to approach the Consumer Forum, the applicant could not subsequently invoke arbitration for the same cause of action before another forum.
Analysis
The Court examined Clause 12 of the insurance policy, which provided for arbitration only where a dispute arose regarding the quantum payable under the policy and when liability is otherwise admitted. The clause expressly stipulated that no dispute would be referred to arbitration where the respondent did not accept liability under the policy. The Court observed that the language of the clause was in clear terms and that the respondent’s contention regarding the restricted nature of the arbitration agreement was supported by earlier Supreme Court judgments like Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, and SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1.
The Court referred to United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd., (2018) 17 SCC 607, wherein it was held that:
“Thus understood, there can be no arbitration in cases where the insurance company disputes or does not accept the liability under or in respect of the policy.”
The Court explained that if the insurer accepts that it is liable under the policy but disputes only the amount payable, the arbitration clause may operate. However, if the insurer repudiates the claim and disputes its liability under the policy, the earlier line of authorities treated such dispute as being outside the scope of a restricted arbitration clause.
The Court relied on Vulcan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Maharaj Singh, (1976) 1 SCC 943, wherein it was laid down that:
“As a rule, where the amount of the loss or damage is the only matter which the parties refer to arbitration, then if the insurers repudiate any liability on the policy there is no obligation on the assured to arbitrate as to the amount before commencing an action on the policy.”
The Court observed that the crucial issue before it was not whether repudiation was legally valid or whether the dispute ultimately fell within the scope of Clause 12 that puts a restriction on the nature of dispute which can be referred to arbitration. The real question was whether, while exercising powers under Section 11, Arbitration Act, the Court was required to finally decide all these disputed issues before constituting the Arbitral Tribunal.
The Court relied on Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel, (2025) 2 SCC 147, wherein it was held that the insertion of Section 11(6-A), Arbitration Act confined the examination by the Court to the “existence” of an arbitration agreement and that all that the Court is required to see is whether an arbitration agreement exists, “nothing more, nothing less”.
The Court emphasised that the courts dealing with appointment of an arbitrator are not expected to conduct a full trial regarding all disputes raised between the parties. The Court highlighted that Krish Spg. clarified that:
“the scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing else.”
Further, in Krish Spg., the Supreme Court had further cautioned that if the referral court examines accord and satisfaction at that stage, it would amount to:
“usurpation of the power which the parties had intended to be exercisable by the Arbitral Tribunal alone and not by the national courts.”
The Court observed that the present proceedings cannot be converted into a full adjudication regarding the scope of Clause 12. A distinction must be maintained between the final issue whether the dispute is arbitrable and the limited enquiry which this Court is required to undertake at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator.
The Court also referred to subsequent decisions applying these principles in insurance policy disputes, including Pragati Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6298, Inox World Industries (P) Ltd. v. IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2873, and Payu Payments (P) Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6777. These decisions held that disputes relating to repudiation, arbitrability and the scope of insurance arbitration clauses must be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal rather than the referral court.
The Court noted that the parties had entered into a written arbitration agreement and that the controversy related instead to the legal effect of repudiation, the applicability of the exclusionary language in Clause 12, alleged accord and satisfaction, limitation and election of remedies. The Court opined that these questions could not be answered merely by looking at the existence of Clause 12. They required examination of the communications exchanged between the parties, the nature and circumstances of the claims, the respondent’s stand and the effect of the alleged settlement or satisfaction.
Regarding the respondent’s plea based on the doctrine of election, the Court referred to National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan, (2006) 2 SCC 641, which explained that where when 2 remedies are available for the same relief, the aggrieved party has the option to elect either of them but not both. However, the Court observed that the existence of a plea of election or accord and satisfaction is not the same thing as proof of election or proof of discharge. It would be necessary to ascertain what exactly was offered, what was accepted, whether acceptance was unconditional, whether the settlement was intended to be final and whether the claims now raised are inconsistent with the earlier position. These questions may require examination of documents, making these issues appropriate for determination by the Tribunal.
The Court opined that leaving the matter to be decided by the Tribunal would not mean that the respondent’s objections were rejected on merit and it would be entitled to contend before the Tribunal that the clause was a restricted arbitration clause and that, because liability was disputed, no dispute was referable to arbitration. And at the same time, the applicant could also contend that the repudiation was unilateral and did not amount to complete denial of liability. The Arbitral Tribunal would also be competent to examine the application of the doctrine of election.
The Court further observed that an incorrect refusal to refer disputes to arbitration could leave a claimant without an effective forum since the statutory scheme does not provide an ordinary appeal against every order passed under Section 11, Arbitration Act either appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator, a concern expressly noted by the Supreme Court in Krish Spg. Consequently, judicial restraint was necessary so that all objections could be fully examined before the forum chosen by the parties under their arbitration agreement.
Also Read: Retrospective Application of the 2015 Amendment and Unilateral Appointment of Arbitrators
Decision
Allowing the application to the limited extent, the Court appointed a former Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. The Court expressly kept open all questions concerning arbitrability, validity and effect of repudiation, accord and satisfaction, doctrine of election, limitation, quantum, jurisdiction and merits of the claims for determination by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal was granted liberty to consider objections regarding its jurisdiction and arbitrability under Section 16, Arbitration Act independently and in accordance with law.
[Samraj Gold Exports (P) Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Arbitration Application (L) No. 12810 of 2026, decided on 14-8-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Applicant: Gauraj Shah with Harjot Singh i/by Atique Ur Rehman.
For the Respondent: Anup Kumar Mathur with Dharmendra D. Jadhav i/by Shrivatsa Legal LLP.