Supreme Court: In an appeal challenging High Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution against concurrent findings of a statutory arbitrator and Delhi Co-operative Tribunal (Tribunal) regarding claimant membership and subsequent allotment of plot in the respondent Society, the Division Bench of Atul S. Chandurkar* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ., declined to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court, holding that the High Court did not exceed its certiorari jurisdiction in setting aside the orders of the arbitrator and the Tribunal.
The Court held that a High Court’s interference under certiorari is permissible where statutory authorities ignore material documentary evidence and arrive at a perverse finding; such intervention corrects an error of law apparent from the record, rather than amounting to impermissible appellate reappreciation of facts.
Factual Matrix
In the instant matter, the dispute arose from the claim of the original claimant, to membership of Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (respondent Society) and consequential allotment of a residential plot. He asserted that he had been a member of the society and had fulfilled the obligations necessary for obtaining a plot, but had been illegally deprived of allotment.
In the earlier round of litigation, an ex-parte award directing allotment of a plot in his favour was set aside by the Supreme Court on 21 August 2002, with a direction that the arbitration proceedings continue from the stage at which the society had been proceeded against ex parte. The original arbitrator having died, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Delhi, took over as arbitrator.
On remand, the arbitrator held on 7 October 2003 that original claimant was a member of the respondent Society and had performed his duties and obligations towards securing allotment of a plot. Accordingly, the arbitrator directed the Managing Committee to allot a plot to his legal heir upon payment of the full cost of the land. The Tribunal dismissed the respondent Society’s appeal and affirmed the order.
Thereafter, the respondent Society invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and relied on documentary material showing that the original claimant had resigned from membership in 1951, the resignation had been accepted, and his subsequent attempt to obtain membership in 1952 had not been accepted by the respondent Society. The High Court found that the arbitrator and Tribunal had failed to consider material documents and consequently set aside their orders.
Issue for Determination
Whether the High Court was justified, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, in interfering with the concurrent orders of the arbitrator and the Tribunal on the question of the original claimant’s membership and consequential entitlement to allotment of a plot?
Analysis
At the outset, the Court reiterated the settled limits of certiorari jurisdiction. It relied on Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1954) 2 SCC 881 and noted that a writ court does not sit as an appellate court and ordinarily will not reappreciate evidence merely because another view is possible. At the same time, certiorari can be issued where there is a jurisdictional error, violation of natural justice, or an error of law apparent on the face of the record. A factual finding unsupported by evidence, or one which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence, may amount to an error of law and therefore justify interference.
The Court further relied on Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, (2023) 16 SCC 462, reiterating that findings based on “no evidence”, surmises, conjectures or perversity can be challenged in certiorari proceedings. Certiorari corrects jurisdictional errors and patent errors; it is not a mechanism for correcting every erroneous decision.
The Court held that though the scope for interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction is limited, an error of law evident from the record is open to correction by the High Court.
“If a finding is recorded without there being any evidence on record or a finding is recorded without any supporting document, whatsoever, a case for interference would be made out since such finding would amount to an error of law.”
On examining the record, the Court found that the arbitrator and Tribunal had “glossed over relevant documentary material on record”, including the original claimant’s resignation from membership, acceptance of that resignation in the Managing Committee meeting dated 5 May 1951, transfer of his share to another member on 18 August 1951, rejection of his subsequent membership application in the Managing Committee meeting dated 5 November 1952 and rejection of his request to deposit money for a plot. The Court asserted that consideration of these documents could lead to only one conclusion that the original claimant was not a member of the society.
The Court observed that instead of examining the documentary record, the arbitrator presumed that the original claimant continued to be a member throughout his lifetime merely because his name appeared in a list of members. Accordingly, it held that perversity in the finding of the Registrar is evident.
Further, noting that the Tribunal subsequently affirmed that conclusion through a short and cryptic order, the Court opined that the High Court was justified in examining whether the findings were sustainable on the material actually available on record.
The Court also noted that there were 4 prior claimants seeking allotment of plots. Even apart from the absence of membership, this circumstance supported the High Court’s refusal to grant the original claimant’s claim at the expense of persons whose claims were prior.
Once the Court concluded that the original claimant had never been admitted as a member, the question of whether a plot was actually available became immaterial. Since he was not a member and therefore had no entitlement to allotment, the Court found it unnecessary to enter into the dispute regarding actual availability of a plot.
Decision
The Court held that the High Court did not exceed its certiorari jurisdiction in setting aside the orders of the arbitrator and the Tribunal. Accordingly, it declined to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. Consequently, the civil appeals were dismissed, with no order as to costs.
[Prakash Narain Sharma v. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society, Civil Appeal Nos. 10693—10694 of 2026, decided on 31-8-2026]
*Judgment Authored by Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: Mr. Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Sr. Adv. Mr. T. V. Ratnam, AOR Mr. Rajendra Prasad Maurya, Adv.
For the Respondents: Ashim Vachher, Sr. Adv. Mr. Shantanu Kumar, AOR Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sharma, Adv. Mr. Vinayak Uniyal, Adv. Mr. Prashant Kumar, AOR