Landmark Constitutional Law Judgments in 2025: Supreme Court of India

This article is a roundup of all the landmark constitutional law judgments delivered and reported in the second half of 2025 inclusive of all the judgments that showcased consideration, interpretation and evolution of important constitutional law principles. The judgments in Part III out of the total 75 significant ones of the four part series are as follows:

Abbreviations for various common terminologies in the judgements

AFS — Air Force School	Art. — Article
Co. — Company	COI — Constitution of India
CBSE — Central Board of Secondary Education	CB — Constitution Bench
EP Act — Environment Protection Act, 1986	FY — Financial Year
EP Rules — Environment Protection Rules, 1986	GP — Gram Panchayat
HC — High Court	IG — Inspector-General
IAF Society — Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society	IAF — Indian Air Force
IT Act — Income-Tax Act, 1961	ITR — income tax returns
JUR — judgment under review	Ltd. — Limited
LC – lower court	MBA — Madras Bar Association case
NIT — notice inviting tender	Prior EC — prior environmental clearance
Rules of 2016 — Odisha Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016	Rules of 1999 — Chhattisgarh Gram Panchayat (Sanitation, Conservancy, Prevention and Abatement of Nuisance and Regulation of Places Disposal of Dead Bodies) Rules, 1999
Registration Rules, 2008 — Bihar Registration Rules, 2008	SCSC — Search-cum-Selection Committee
SC — Supreme Court	Sec. — Section
SOP — standard operating procedure	SOP — separation of powers
SPP — Special Public Prosecutor	Tribunal Rules, 2017 — Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017
u/s — under Section	UOI — Union of India
w.e.f. — with effect from	WP — writ petition

The judgments are as follows:

(1) Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh¹

(Delivered on 27-1-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma

Authored by: Justice B.V. Nagarathna

The appeals arose from the judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court, which declined to grant permission to the petitioner to accord a decent burial to his deceased father in the graveyard being used by tribals and other communities in the same Gram Panchayat. The appellant belonged to the Christian faith, being a native resident of village Chhindwada, Tehsil Darbha, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh. When he attempted the decent burial of his father in his own native village, it was met with abrupt hurdles when the villagers objected to and opposed the burial of the appellant’s father within the village. The local police also exhorted the appellant’s family to take the body out of the village to 25—30 kms for burying the dead. The petitioner then complained to the police authorities, followed by institution of writ petition before the Chhattisgarh High Court for a direction to the State authorities for permitting the appellant to carry out the burial at the same site where his ancestors were buried in the village of Chhindwada and also sought police protection to that end. Pertinently, the Gram Panchayat also issued a certificate certifying that there existed no graveyard for Christian community within the limits of Gram Panchayat. The Chhattisgarh High Court disposing of the writ petition directing the burial at a place 20—25 kms away from village Chhindwada. The High Court accepted the position that there existed no separate burial ground/graveyard for the members of Christian community in the Gram Panchayat and the predecessors were buried in the same graveyard (meant for other communities) out of harmony shown by the village residents earlier.

Analysis and consideration by the court

The Supreme Court on the basis of pleadings exchanged between the parties found that there existed no dedicated graveyard for burial of Christian community in village Chhindwada. The birth, marriage and death rituals are carried out as per the religious traditions to which the residents belonged. It also found that the existing graveyard was belonging to Hindu Mahara community. However the members of Christian Mahara community were permitted to bury their relatives, but this was through an oral arrangement without any formal order in the said regard.

Referring to Rule 5, Chhattisgarh Gram Panchayat (Sanitation, Conservancy, Prevention and Abatement of Nuisance and Regulation of Places Disposal of Dead Bodies) Rules, 1999 (for short, “Rules of 1999”), the court observed that it is the duty of the Gram Panchayat to ensure that dead person of the village is buried as early as possible and within a period of 24 hours irrespective of whatever faith he follows. But Rules 4 and 5 obliges the Gram Panchayat to arrange for disposal of the corpse as also the suitable place where it shall be done. Rule 8 prescribes digging of any grave within a distance of 1 m from any grave or outside the place marked by the Gram Panchayat for any community.

The court then observed that the Village Panchayat abdicated its constitutional duty to ensure decent burial of appellant’s father in terms of the statutory provisions and obligations. The denial of burial rights to a person of Christian community is nothing but a violation of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, and also denial of equality before the law with equal protection of the laws. It smacks of hostile discrimination, divisiveness and gives an impression that certain religious sections of the village can be discriminated against. This is also against the sublime principles of secularism as also the glorious traditions of our country believing in “Sarva Dharma Samanvaya” and “Sarva Dharma Sambhava”. The Gram Panchayat was therefore held to have failed in discharging its duty to approve a place of burial for the Mahara community following the Christian faith and in formally designating a site as a graveyard for the Christian community. Accordingly, in her split verdict, Justice Nagarathna directed as follows:

1. the appellant shall be permitted to conduct the funeral rites of his father in his private agricultural land in the same village at the earliest,

2. the police authorities shall provide adequate security and protection to the appellant and his family to carry out the funeral rites of his father at his private agricultural land as aforesaid, and

3. the State and all the local authorities are directed to demarcate exclusive sites as graveyards for burial of Christians throughout the State in accordance with law.

Referring to the judgment of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India², the court reiterated that golden principle of fraternity which is enshrined in the Preamble is of the greatest importance and rightfully finds place in the Preamble. The courts of law must be guided by the sublime realisation that Bharat is a secular nation committed to securing fundamental rights to all sections. The court then referred to the celebrated quote of Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy from the judgment of Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala³:

27. …our tradition teaches tolerance; our philosophy preaches tolerance; our Constitution practises tolerance; let us not dilute it.

The appeal was thus disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

However, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma delivered a split verdict taking a different view. He opined as follows:

Referring to Section 49(12) read with Section 95 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 as also the Rules of 1999, he interpreted the rules to imply that graves cannot be arbitrarily constructed, but must be established in designated areas identified by the Gram Panchayat. This is because designation of any identified area for burial serves a salutary purpose of ensuring a systematized procedure of conducting last rites without paying due deference to the surrounding sensitivities, but also importantly encompasses a public health angle. The earmarking of designated areas for every community in every village is an evolutionary process that is not perfect and slow-moving, however it seeks to delicately handle aspects of human life and beyond which must receive adequate judicial attention. Thus invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution of India was not required to overcome the prohibition encapsulated under Rule 8 of the Rules of 1999 as has been done in the split verdict of Justice Nagarathna. The appellant can be required to bury the remains of the deceased on his private land, if the designated burial ground is merely 20—25 kms in village Karkapal.

The court speaking through Justice S.C. Sharma also observed that procedures pertaining to last rites; and ceremonies involved form a part of rights protected under Part III of the Constitution of India, but it would not encompass the unqualified right to choose the “place of such ceremony” (including burial). If the right is required to encompass also the “place of such ceremony”, it would prima facie appear to stretch constitutional limits beyond what was envisaged. After all the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion under Article 25 is ex facie subject to public order and Article 25(2) enables the State to frame provisions regulating certain activities associated with religious practices. Therefore, absolute or unqualified right in respect of exact “place of burial” of a person under Articles 21 and 25 prima facie cannot be claimed as an absolute right. However, State also has a duty to provide members of all religious communities with identified places to carry out last rites within the confines and limits of reason and rationality. In the present case, since the identified designated burial ground for the Christian community is merely 20—25 kilometers away, therefore appellant cannot be permitted to claim an absolute or unqualified right in respect of deceased’s exact place of burial. After all the maintenance of public order is paramount and in the larger interests of the society. The split verdict of Justice Sharma therefore issued the following directions, different from that issued by Justice Nagarathna:

1. the appellant and his family be provided with an appropriate site within the designated Christian burial ground in Village Karkapal for the burial of deceased remains,

2. appellant and his family be provided with all ancillary logistical support for the purpose of transferring the remains of the deceased to the burial ground along with adequate police protection, and

3. the State authorities shall ensure that no disturbance of public order takes place in either of the villages.

The appeal accordingly was disposed of in terms of the aforesaid directions:

Since there was no consensus between the members of the Bench, the directions mutually agreeable to both the members were passed as follows:

1. the appellant shall conduct the funeral rites and bury his deceased father at the burial ground at village Karkapal on his private land, and

2. the respondent-State and its local authorities with the State authorities shall ensure adequate police protection and overseeing that public order is not disturbed.

The appeal was accordingly disposed of with the aforesaid directions issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and in the aforesaid terms.

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(2) Maatr Sparsh an Initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India⁴

(Delivered on 19-2-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and P.B. Varale

Authored by: Justice B.V. Nagarathna

The present petition was filed as a public interest litigation by Maatr Sparsh: An Initiative by Avyaan Foundation, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) working towards establishing feeding rooms, child-care rooms and creches at public places. The petitioner sought directions requiring governments and public authorities to provide such facilities and to protect the rights of nursing mothers and infants regarding the availability of suitable feeding, nursing and child-care facilities at public places.

The issue was brought into focus after one of the NGO’s Directors, personally experienced the difficulties faced by nursing mothers in public spaces following the birth of her child. The petitioner contended that mothers should not be compelled to choose between remaining at home and meeting their child’s nutritional needs or going into public spaces without adequate facilities for breastfeeding.

Earlier a petition filed by the petitioner’s Director before the Delhi High Court in Master Avyaan Rastogi through Guardian Neha Rastogi v. Union of India⁵, in which the Union of India informed the Delhi High Court that it considered feeding rooms and child-care rooms to be essential services. The Union Government had also issued letters to all States and Union Territories requesting them to establish such facilities for women and children. The Delhi High Court disposed of the petition while directing the authorities to maintain the feeding rooms that had already become operational. The High Court also expressed the expectation that more feeding and changing rooms would be made operational.

Despite these steps, the petitioner maintained that there was still no sufficient implementation of such facilities throughout public spaces in the country.

Importance of breastfeeding and rights of nursing mothers

Before issuing directions, the Supreme Court examined the broader constitutional and human-rights significance of breastfeeding. The court recognised breastfeeding as an important component of a child’s right to life, survival and development and the highest attainable standard of health.

It noted the expert recommendation that infants should ordinarily be exclusively breastfed for the first six months, after which appropriate complementary food should be introduced while breastfeeding continues up to two years or beyond. The court also connected this principle with Section 5(a), National Food Security Act, 2013.

The court stressed that the health of an infant cannot be separated from the status and well-being of the mother. Since the child’s right to breastfeeding is inseparably connected with the mother, the mother correspondingly has the right and ability to breastfeed her child. Therefore, the State has an obligation to create an adequate and conducive environment in which mothers can breastfeed their children.

The Supreme Court recognised that the rights of nursing mothers and infants are closely connected with Article 21, as breastfeeding is linked to the child’s right to life, health and development and the mother’s right to dignity, privacy and comfort. The State therefore has a responsibility not merely to permit breastfeeding, but to create suitable conditions for it. This obligation is reinforced by Articles 39(f) and 47, which require the State to protect children’s healthy development and improve nutrition and public health. The court also referred to international standards, including Article 25(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 2016 Joint Statement of UN experts, and Articles 3 and 24 of the UNCRC, particularly the principles of the best interests of the child, the right to health and the importance of breastfeeding. At the same time, Article 51-A(e) places a responsibility on citizens to avoid practices that undermine women’s dignity, including the stigmatisation of breastfeeding in public. In this context, the court considered the 27 February 2024 advisory of the Ministry of Women and Child Development, which called for gender-friendly spaces, feeding rooms, creches, sanitary facilities and similar infrastructure in workplaces and public places. The advisory also referred to schemes such as the Palna Scheme and emphasised that such facilities should be viewed as an investment in women’s dignity, welfare, productivity and participation in the workforce.

Resolution by the court

The Supreme Court observed that the advisory of 27 February 2024 substantially addressed the relief sought by the petitioner. The court held that feeding and child-care facilities are essential for protecting the privacy, dignity and comfort of nursing mothers, while supporting breastfeeding and infant health. Such facilities also enable women to participate more effectively in public life and employment. The court thus held that the advisory was consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution of India.

Directions issued by the court

The court did not issue an entirely new nationwide scheme. Instead, it relied upon and strengthened the existing Central Government advisory by directing the Union of India to circulate the 27 February 2024 advisory again to the Chief Secretaries/Administrators of all States and Union Territories, along with a copy of the Supreme Court’s order. The objective was to ensure implementation of the advisory and thereby facilitate nursing mothers, particularly those who need to breastfeed their infants in public places.

The court disposed of the petition directing the States and Union Territories to implement feeding and child-care facilities in existing public places as far as practicable and to reserve suitable space for such facilities even in buildings under construction or planning. It also encouraged Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) to provide dedicated spaces for child-care, feeding and nursing, recognising these measures as consistent with Articles 14 and 15(3). The Union Government was directed to implement these directions within two weeks of receiving the order.

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(3) Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand⁶

(Delivered on 27-2-2025)

Coram – two-Judge Bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Sandeep Mehta

Authored by: Justice Pankaj Mithal

The Supreme Court in the present civil appeals examined transparency and fairness in public employment under Articles 14 and 16, along with whether appointed candidates were entitled to a hearing before a fresh merit panel was prepared. It held that when the underlying recruitment is void ab initio, the appointees cannot claim a right to continue merely because they were appointed.

Factual matrix of the case

The controversy originated with an advertisement issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamu on 29 July 2010, inviting applications for appointment to post of Class-IV employees. The advertisement prescribed VIII pass educational qualification, a compulsory cycling test, medical fitness, age requirements and certain preferences, including preference to local candidates and government employees. It also stated that the recruitment process would be governed by governmental instructions and that the selection process was intended to be transparent. However, the advertisement did not specify the total number of vacancies or clearly disclose the number of reserved and unreserved posts. This omission subsequently became central to the Supreme Court’s determination of the legality of the entire recruitment exercise.

Although the advertisement was issued in 2010, the examination was ultimately conducted on 5 November 2017. Thereafter, a press release required successful candidates to appear for counselling. Following counselling, the District Education Officer issued appointment orders on 9 March 2018, including an appointment in favour of the appellant, Amrit Yadav.

The recruitment process, however, became controversial when an FIR was registered alleging rampant corruption and large-scale cheating in the examination. At the same time, certain candidates who had not been selected approached the Jharkhand High Court challenging the selection process. The High Court initially allowed the non-selected candidate’s petitions, holding that interview marks had been wrongly introduced despite no interview being prescribed in the advertisement. It directed preparation of a fresh merit list based solely on written-examination marks, which was affirmed by the Division Bench and attained finality. Consequently, Amrit Yadav, being lower in merit on the written examination, was excluded from the fresh panel and terminated on 7 December 2020. His challenge to the termination was dismissed by the Single Judge and subsequently by the Division Bench on 24 November 2022, after which he approached the Supreme Court.

Issues before the court

The Supreme Court identified two principal questions for its consideration:

1. Whether the advertisement dated 29 July 2010 and the recruitment process conducted pursuant to it were legally valid.

2. Whether the High Court was justified in directing preparation of a fresh selection panel without impleading or hearing candidates who had already been appointed and whose services would consequently be affected.

In re: Issue 1: Validity of the recruitment advertisement

A. Requirement of transparency in public recruitment

The Supreme Court began by examining the advertisement against established principles governing public employment. The court relied substantially upon its earlier decision in Renu v. District Judge, Tis Hazari⁷, where it had emphasised that a public recruitment advertisement must provide sufficient information regarding the number of posts, eligibility conditions, recruitment schedule and the procedure governing selection. The purpose is to prevent arbitrariness and, particularly, to ensure that the selection criteria are not altered after the process has commenced. The court reiterated that a valid public employment advertisement should ordinarily make clear, among other things like the total number of vacancies; the reservation structure; minimum qualifications; eligibility requirements; and the stages and method of selection, including written examination, oral examination or interview, wherever applicable.

Thus, the advertisement itself forms an important part of ensuring equality of opportunity under Articles 14 and 16.

B. Reservation and disclosure of vacancies

The court also discussed the constitutional position concerning reservation. Relying upon Mukesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand⁸ and the constitutional principles governing Articles 16(4) and 16(4-A), the court explained that these provisions are enabling provisions. The State is not under an absolute obligation to provide reservation in every recruitment exercise. However, where reservation is provided, the decision must be supported by the relevant constitutional requirements and material.

Consequently, the court held that an advertisement must disclose the reserved and unreserved vacancies. Even if the State decides not to provide reservation, that decision must be transparently communicated in the advertisement, particularly where it is based upon the State’s assessment of adequate representation.

C. Defects in the 2010 advertisement

Applying these principles to the case, the court found a fundamental defect in the 29 July 2010 advertisement. The advertisement was silent regarding both the total number of posts and the division between reserved and general-category vacancies. The court considered this omission incompatible with the requirement of transparency in public employment.

The Court also referred to State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3)⁹, reiterating that appointments made in violation of statutory rules and the constitutional requirements of Articles 14 and 16 cannot be sustained. The court thus found the defect was not merely procedural or irregular. The entire recruitment process flowing from the advertisement was legally invalid. The court declared that the advertisement itself was a nullity in law, and consequently the recruitment process undertaken pursuant to it was void.

In re: Issue 2: Natural justice and hearing of appointed candidates

The second issue required the court to examine whether the earlier High Court order was invalid because candidates who had already secured appointments were not heard before the fresh panel was ordered.

A. Earlier High Court direction had attained finality

The Supreme Court clarified an important procedural aspect that the original challenge before the High Court had principally concerned the alleged alteration of the selection process through the introduction of interview marks. The Single Judge had therefore directed preparation of a fresh panel based upon written examination marks alone. That order had been affirmed by the Division Bench in 2019 and had not been challenged further by the appellant or the State at that time.

Therefore, when the appellant subsequently challenged his termination, he could not use the second round of litigation to reopen a question that had already attained finality.

B. General principle of natural justice

The Supreme Court nevertheless examined the appellant’s argument concerning audi alteram partem. The court while referring to the judgment of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE¹⁰ explained that natural justice is not an inflexible or mechanical requirement. Its application depends upon the circumstances, the nature of the decision and the extent to which the affected person is prejudiced.

The court specifically noted that even where there has technically been a breach of natural justice, an order need not automatically be invalidated if the failure to provide a hearing has caused no prejudice. The controlling consideration is whether there was a genuine denial of a fair opportunity.

Why no hearing was necessary in the present case

The court found that the appellant’s appointment itself was void in law, because the recruitment process was constitutionally invalid from its inception. Consequently, the appellant did not acquire a legally enforceable right to continue in service merely because he had been appointed and had served for some time. Giving him an opportunity of hearing before preparation of a fresh panel would not have altered the fundamental defect in the recruitment process. The court therefore regarded such a hearing as an exercise in futility.

The court further relying upon the judgment of Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh¹¹ recognised that where an appointment is a nullity because it was made without the required authority or approval, giving the appointee an opportunity before termination may serve no meaningful purpose.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that because the appointments in the present case were ab initio nullities, the absence of a prior hearing did not invalidate the High Court’s direction.

Consequence of a void recruitment process

The court went further and considered the broader consequences of an invalid public recruitment process. Relying upon the judgment of M.P. State Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Nanuram Yadav¹², the court reiterated that public appointments must comply with the prescribed rules and constitutional requirements. Appointments made contrary to mandatory statutory provisions cannot be legitimised through subsequent regularisation or misplaced sympathy. Where the irregularity or illegality affects the selection process broadly, the entire selection may have to be cancelled rather than individual appointments being examined separately.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court quashed the 29 July 2010 advertisement and all appointments arising from it for violating Articles 14 and 16. It directed the State of Jharkhand to conduct the entire recruitment process afresh through a new advertisement issued within six months. Appropriate age relaxation was also directed for candidates affected by the prolonged litigation, while the connected appeals were dismissed as academic.

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(4) Pragya Prasun v. Union of India¹³

(Delivered on 30-4-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices, J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan

Authored by: Justice R. Mahadevan

The present case arises out of two writ petitions that were consolidated and heard together due to a common question of law and fact.

In the first petition the petitioners (Pragya Prasun) are survivors of acid attacks who suffer from permanent facial disfigurement and severe eye burns. Their disability renders them unable to perform the basic physical acts required by the digital KYC/e-KYC process like clicking a live selfie, blinking on command or positioning their face within a designated frame. As a direct consequence they were unable to open bank accounts or obtain subscriber identity module (SIM) cards from telecom service providers.

The second petition filed by the petitioner (Amar Jain), is a person suffering from 100 per cent blindness. His disability poses daily barriers to establishing account-based relationships, conducting financial transactions, verifying his identity as a customer and accessing government schemes. He contended that the prevailing digital KYC norms are entirely incompatible with his condition.

Both sets of petitioners are recognised as persons with disabilities (PwD) under the schedule appended to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (for short, “the 2016 RPwD Act”).

How digital KYC excludes persons with disabilities

In light of the directions issued in Reserve Bank of India (RBI) KYC Master Directions, 2016, digital KYC encompassing e-KYC, video KYC and biometric verification became the standard mode of identity verification across banking, insurance, security markets, telecom and pension sectors. The method employed during the process includes:

1. clicking a live selfie (with the “liveness” being tested by the ability to blink),

2. face recognition and positioning of the face within a specific frame,

3. signing using pen, paper or digital screen,

4. printing, scanning or clicking a photograph of a filled application form,

5. completing one-time password (OTP) verification within 30 seconds, and

6. responding to random questions or reading flashing text.

Reasons behind the failure of these methods were that they are structurally inaccessible to persons with visual impairments or facial disfigurements. For example, face recognition does not provide guidance on how to correctly align one’s face before the camera. Acid attack survivors with damaged eyelids or eye tissue cannot physically blink on command. Screen readers are often incompatible with the KYC platforms and crucial information is presented in visual formats without alternative text. Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) tests, unlabelled form fields and biometric verification methods further exclude persons with visual impairments.

Additionally, many platforms require fine motor control, such as precise selfie clicking or digital signature capture, which is not feasible for persons with mobility impairment. Videos without captions prevent deaf users from accessing information. The petitioners further highlighted that many of these platforms are not compatible with assistive technologies.

As a result of this a large number of persons with disabilities are either delayed in establishing their identity or are all together excluded from accessing financial services with government schemes.

Digital access as a constitutional right

The court, while considering the issue, observed that in the contemporary era, where access to essential services, governance, education, healthcare and economic opportunities is increasingly mediated through digital platforms, the right to life under Article 21 must be reinterpreted in light of these technological realities. The digital divide, characterised by unequal access to digital infrastructure, skills and content, perpetuates systematic exclusion, not only to persons with disabilities but also to senior citizens, rural populations, economically weaker communities and linguistic minorities.

The court held that bridging the digital divide is no longer merely a matter of policy discretion but has become a constitutional imperative to secure a life of dignity, autonomy and equal participation in public life. Digital access, therefore, emerges as an intrinsic component of the right to life and liberty. This necessitates that the State proactively design and implement inclusive digital ecosystems that serve not only the privileged but also those who have been historically excluded.

Accessibility as a human right

The court while referring to international human rights jurisprudence held that the “right to accessibility” is not a new or separate human right but an integral part of existing human rights frameworks. Access to the physical environment, transportation, information and communication is essential for the realisation of freedom of movement (Article 13 UDHR), freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19 UDHR) and the right to live independently and participate in society. These rights are foundational for enabling PwDs to enjoy their rights on an equal basis with others.

The 2016 RPwD Act as a super statute

Drawing from its earlier decisions in Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, In re¹⁴, the court reiterated that the 2016 RPwD Act carries the sanctity of a super statute. Any denial of rights guaranteed under this Act amounts to a violation of constitutionally protected fundamental rights. The court also relied on the judgments of Vikash Kumar v. UPSC¹⁵, Rajive Raturi v. Union of India¹⁶, Disabled Rights Group v. Union of India¹⁷ and Distribution of Essential Supplies & Services during Pandemic, In re¹⁸ to underscore that accessibility is a binding obligation and not a matter of administrative grace.

Petitioners’ right to demand accommodation

The court held that the acid attack survivors and the blind petitioners are undeniably recognised as PwD under the 2016 RPwD Act. Their inability to complete digital KYC tasks such as blinking, face positioning or interpreting visual prompts is a direct consequence of their disabilities. The constitutional and legal provisions discussed in the judgment confer upon these persons the statutory right to demand accessibility and appropriate reasonable accommodations in the digital KYC process. The respondents had themselves fairly acknowledged their commitment to meeting accessibility guidelines and standards. It was therefore imperative that digital KYC guidelines be revised with accessibility at the core.

Directions issued by the court

The court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 32 issued comprehensive directions to ensure that digital KYC and other online services are fully accessible to persons with disabilities. The court mandated compliance with accessibility standards for all government and private regulated entities, directed RBI to revise its KYC framework by introducing inclusive verification methods beyond eye-blinking, strengthening OTP-based and video KYC, and retaining paper-based KYC as an accessible alternative. It further ordered the adoption of accessible digital platforms in line with WCAG 2.1 and GIGW standards, provision of reasonable accommodations such as Braille, sign language, captions and voice-enabled services, creation of grievance redressal mechanisms, dedicated helplines, human review of rejected KYC applications, disability sensitisation of officials, and regular monitoring by RBI to ensure effective implementation of these directions.

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(5) Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India¹⁹

(Delivered on 21-5-2025)

Coram: three-Judge Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka, Augustine George Masih and Ahsanuddin Amanullah

Authored by: Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ahsanuddin Amanullah

The appeals arose out of the judgment delivered by the Allahabad High Court, which held that Air Force School (for short, “AFS”) is not a “state or authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Air Force School was established in the year 1966 for imparting education to children of the personnel of the Indian Air Force, being run by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society (for short, “IAF Society”). This Society was established with the sole purpose of Air Force School, which were affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE).

Before the High Court, certain employees of the Air Force School filed writ petitions challenging the decisions pertaining to their services like relief of confirmation or challenge to disciplinary proceedings and such other reliefs. The batch of petitions was initially allowed by the Single Bench, against which Air Force School preferred appeals before the Division Bench, which upturned the verdict of the Single Bench.

Consideration and analysis by the court

Appellants relied upon the judgment of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani²⁰ to contend that even if a private authority is imparting functions of a public nature possessing the character of a public duty, mandamus will lie. The writ petition becomes maintainable for the purposes of enforcement of decisions of the affiliating university, which are sought to be enforced by the employees of the private institution concerned.

The majority opinion however relied upon the judgment of St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava²¹ to hold that application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is though maintainable even against a private person or body discharging public duties or functions, however what is to be seen is the nature of public duty cast upon such body or person. If the nature of the duty or obligation is towards the public, involving a public law element, pertaining to the collective benefit of the section of people at large, so accepted by them, then a writ can be issued against even such a private person or body.

The act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of a public duty, as individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as their integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition. If the service conditions are regulated by statutory provisions or the employer has the status of State, then Article 226 would not lie. Therefore distinction must be made between a public function or public duty on one hand and actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing on the other, the latter of which is not amenable to constitutional challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The court then relying on the judgement of Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma²² observed that in the said case Army Welfare Education Society was held not to be a “state or authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. A breach of contract alleged against the school/employee cannot be treated to be touching any public law element, nor can the school be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the teachers. The court also found that there was no material on record which showed that the school was actually financed by the Indian Air Force (for short, “IAF”). The Education Code which applies to Air Force School was also not a statutory code having the force of law, but was simply issued under the authority of the Board of Governors of the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society. The day-to-day control of the school was found to be with the School Managing Committee and no document showed the pervasive and dominant control of the Indian Air Force over the day-to-day affairs of the school. Although some funds may have originated from the Army Welfare Society, it was held that the same cannot be treated as the school being controlled by the Indian Air Force. Accordingly, the majority opinion affirmed the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court and held that relationship between the appellants and the said school was purely in the realm of private contract. The breach of such private contract would not involve any public law element. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed by the majority.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah

Justice Amanullah delivered a dissenting opinion disagreeing with the majority stating that the writ petition against Air Force School is maintainable. He quoted the following facts and reasoning for inferring that Air Force School was under the predominant control and management of Indian Air Force in terms of administration, management, funding, infrastructure development, appointment of staff and a host of other such factors. They were as follows:

1. The very inception of AFS was an outcome of the decision of the Indian Air Force to establish the society as a welfare measure for its officers for the education of their children/wards.

2. All orders, be it appointment, extension of probation, fixation of pay, etc. are passed under the authority of the Indian Air Force Officers, which is evident from the notification issued by the Press Information Bureau of the Defence Wing announcing the appointment of the first Directorate General (administration).

Thus, the supervision, administration and overall control over the working of the school was with the Indian Air Force.

3. The school building and infrastructure development also took place from the public funds under the disposal of the Ministry of Defence, with the pay scales of the school staff fixed by the Indian Air Force Headquarters. Indian Air Force Headquarters also established the Air Force Society, the governing body of which comprises senior Indian Air Force Officers as in-charge of its administration as the Chairman.

4. The schools were constructed on defence owned lands and are allowed to continue with rent free accommodation and allied concessions from the government authorities.

Relying thereafter on the judgments of St. Mary’s Education Society²³ and Sunil Kumar Sharma²⁴, the dissenting opinion discussed that terms of employment of contract between school and its staff/employee cannot be construed as an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. The committee of Indian Air Force controlling the administration of Air Force School exercised disciplinary control over teachers engaged in the public duty of imparting education. Thus the duty of such teachers cannot be treated as being completely disconnected with the overall discharge of public duty by the school.

Referring thereafter to the judgment of Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University²⁵, the dissenting opinion reiterated that functions and activities of a deemed university are governed by regulatory bodies, for which reason they are therefore “other authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Because they are “other authority” under Article 12, they are therefore amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Distinguishing the applicability of the judgment of Sunil Kumar Sharma²⁶, the dissenting opinion went on to hold that facts in the present case are different, since Indian Air Force ensured direct funding and aid from the Government of India in favour of the Air Force School. Referring thereafter to the judgment of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust²⁷, the dissenting opinion observed that teachers form the most vital cog of the educational system, acting as a link between school and the students. Therefore, any matter affecting the service conditions, morale and discipline among the teaching staff has a direct bearing and nexus over the imparting of education by the concerned institution. Therefore, they should be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Referring thereafter to the judgment of Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India²⁸, wherein the Supreme Court held the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) as being amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, the dissenting opinion reiterated that whenever a private body exercises its public functions, even though it may not be a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy under Article 226, by virtue of usage of the expression “for any other purpose” under Article 12.

The court repelled the contention of the Additional Solicitor General (ASG) that funds utilised for the development of campus and buildings were “non-public funds”, not flowing from the corpus of Indian Air Force. The court held that, to the contrary direct funding from the Indian Air Force, and also from the regimental fund is provided for various infrastructural development activities. Besides the above, the Air Force Society enjoys exemption from income tax and other statutory dues, meaning that government forgoes its share by way of taxes on such funds. This indirect support of the Government of India/Ministry of Defence through providing land and granting tax exemptions all goes on to show the implicit government’s financial support to the Air Force School. Thus, the Air Force Society and the Air Force School would all be covered and classified under the phrase “other authorities” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, the dissenting opinion held that writ petitions filed by the appellants were maintainable before the High Court and the view taken by the Division Bench was set aside. The appeals were accordingly allowed in the dissenting view.

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(6) Orissa High Court v. Banshidhar Baug²⁹

(Delivered on 14-7-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices, J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan

Authored by: Justice R. Mahadevan

The Supreme Court in the present petitions examined an important issue concerning the procedure for designation of Senior Advocates under Section 16(2), Advocates Act, 1961 (for short, “the 1961 Act”). The dispute arose after the Orissa High Court, on the judicial side, invalidated Rule 6(9), High Court of Orissa (Designation of Senior Advocate) Rules, 2019 (for short, “2019 Rules”), which empowered the Full Court to designate advocates, suo motu as Senior Advocates. Section 16(2) of the 1961 Act, empowers Supreme Court and High Courts, to designate an advocate as a Senior Advocate if, in their opinion, the advocate possesses exceptional ability, standing at the Bar, or special knowledge or experience in law.

The Supreme Court in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India³⁰ (for short, “Indira Jaising-1”), introduced a structured and transparent procedure for designation of Senior Advocates. The Orissa High Court framed the 2019 Rules in pursuance thereof. The Rules recognised three methods for initiating designation, i.e. 1) A written proposal by the Chief Justice or a Judge 2) application made by the advocate and 3) suo motu designation by the Full Court under Rule 6(9). Pursuant to these Rules, the HC issued a notification inviting applications for eligible advocates. However, before completing the application-based process, the Full Court exercised its suo motu power under Rule 6(9) and designated five advocates as Senior Advocates. Subsequently, another notification was issued, inviting, fresh applications for designation.

These developments prompted certain advocates to file writ petitions before the High Court challenging the Rule 6(9) of the 2019 Rules; the suo motu designations made under the Rule and the subsequent notification inviting fresh applications for designation.

The High Court sitting on the judicial side, held that Rule 6(9) was inconsistent with the principles laid down in Indira Jaising-1 case, declaring it ultra vires the subsequent notification, and directed that the designated advocates be considered afresh along with other applicants.

Aggrieved by this decision of the High Court on its administrative side, approached the Supreme Court.

Issues before the court

The court framed the following issue for its consideration:

1. Whether Rule 6(9) of the 2019 Rules was inconsistent with Section 16(2) of the 1961 Act and the principle laid down in Indira Jaising-1 case³¹.

2. Whether the Full Court retains the authority to designate Senior Advocates, suo motu.

3. Whether the High Court was justified in invalidating Rule 6(9) and the designation made under it.

The petitioners argued that Rule 6(9) merely reflected the statutory power conferred by Section 16(2) of the 1961 Act and therefore could not be declared invalid. They further submitted that the procedure prescribed in Indira Jaising-1, including the permanent committee, secretariat, interview and evaluation mechanism, was intended primarily for advocates who seek designation through applications or written proposal. According to them, these procedural safeguards did not extinguish the independence and authority of the Full Court. The petitioners also emphasised that the High Court’s judgment was rendered before the Supreme Court delivered its earlier decision in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India³² (for short “Indira Jaising-2”), where it expressly reaffirmed the continued existence of the Full Court’s suo motu power.

Resolution of issues by the court

The Supreme Court observed that the authority to designate Senior Advocates originates directly from Section 16(2) of the 1961 Act. The statute confers this power upon Supreme Court and High Court whenever they are satisfied that an advocate deserves such distinction because of ability, standing at the Bar, or spatial knowledge or experience in law. The court noted that, although Indira Jaising-1 introduced institutional safeguards to improve transparency and objectivity, it never intended to abolish the constitutional authority of the Full Court to make suo motu designations. The court relied on the clarifications issued in Indira Jaising-2 case³³, where it was explicitly held that the Full Court’s suo motu power survives and may continue to be exercised in exceptional cases involving eminent advocates through consensus. The court also referred to the later, three-Judge Bench decision in Jitender v. State (NCT of Delhi)³⁴, which revisited the entire framework, governing the Senior Advocates designation. That decision abolishes the mandatory 100- point assessment system introduced in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India, (2017) 9 SCC 766; it also reaffirmed that designation is ultimately a collective decision of the Full Court; It also recognised that deserving advocates may be designated even without submitting applications and emphasise the future Rules should ensure fairness, transparency and institutional integrity while preserving judicial discretion.

The Supreme Court observed that after the subsequent development the High Court had itself amended Rule 6(9) in December 2023. The amended Rule limited suo motu designation to “exceptional and eminent advocates” through consensus of the Full Court, thereby bringing it into conformity with the later judicial pronouncements.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court therefore allowed the petition concluding that the High Court’s declaration striking down Rule 6(9) could no longer be sustained by the earlier declaration. The court while setting aside the reasoning of the High Court held that:

1. The Full Court continues to possess the authority to designate Senior Advocates suo motu.

2. Rule 6(9) as amended is legally valid.

3. The designations already granted to Respondents 5 to 9, remain valid since they were subsequently reconsidered in accordance with the Supreme Court’s interim direction, and

4. The mandate of Rule 6(9) shall continue to operate until fresh Rules are framed in accordance with the principles laid down in Jitender v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 377

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(7) Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India³⁵

(Delivered on 15-7-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi

Authored by: Justice Joymalya Bagchi

The Supreme Court in the present appeal considered an important question concerning the pensionary rights of the bank employees who had been compulsorily retired as a disciplinary penalty.

The appellant was employed as a Chief Manager (Scale IV Officer) in the Central Bank of India (for short “CBoI”). During his tenure as Branch Manager of the Dhanbad Branch, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him alleging several serious irregularities in the sanction of loans relating to twelve accounts. The allegations against the appellant were regarding, sanctioning loans without proper appraisal of borrowers income; failure to verify KYC compliances; omission to conduct post-sanction inspections and exposing the bank to substantial financial loss due to improper lending practices. During the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings the appellant attained the age of superannuation. However, in accordance with Regulation 20(3)(iii), Central Bank of India (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979, the disciplinary proceedings continued even after his retirement.

The inquiry officer concluded that the appellant had failed to discharge his duties honestly and with integrity and that his misconduct had exposed the bank to significant financial loss while serving his own pecuniary interest. After considering the appellant’s reply, the disciplinary authority imposed major penalty of compulsory retirement, effective from the date of superannuation. The appellant challenged the disciplinary order before the appellate authority, namely, the Field General Manager (for short, “FGM”).

While the departmental appeal remained pending, the Regional Manager recommended that the appellant be granted only the minimum pension payable in the cases of compulsory retirement, namely, 2/3rd of the admissible pension. The Field General Manager accepted this recommendation and subsequently dismissed the appellants departmental appeal while also approving payment of only 2/3rd pension.

The appellant approached the High Court challenging various aspects of the disciplinary proceedings. During the hearing he confined his challenge to the denial of full retiral benefits. The High Court directed payment of gratuity but upheld the banks decision to reduce the appellants pension by one-third. Aggrieved by this decision the appellant appealed before the Supreme Court.

The court framed the following issues for its consideration

1. Whether Regulations 33(1) and 33(2) of the Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 (Pension Regulations) should be interpreted independently or conjointly.

2. Whether prior consultation with the Board of Directors is mandatory before reducing the pension payable to an employee compulsorily retired as a disciplinary penalty.

3. Whether ex post facto approval by the Board could cure the absence of prior consultation.

4. Whether the High Court correctly interpreted Regulation 33 while upholding the reduction of pension.

In re: Issue 1

The court rejected the employer bank’s submission that both clauses operate independently. The court observed that Regulation 33(2) expressly refers to situations where the competent authority acts in its original, appellate or review jurisdiction. Restricting the expression “competent authority” only to the disciplinary authority would render the words “appellate” and “review” meaningless.

The court reiterated the settled principle of statutory interpretation that no word in a statute should be treated as redundant or superfluous. Accordingly, Regulations 33(1) and 33(2) must be construed harmoniously rather than independently.

In re: Issue 2

The Supreme Court found that the interpretation advanced by the employer bank created an anomalous situation. If accepted, the very same Field General Manager could reduce pension under Regulation 33(1) without Board’s prior consultation but would require consultation while exercising appellate powers under Regulation 33(2).

The court held that such an interpretation would enable the employer bank to circumvent the mandatory procedural safeguard intentionally incorporated in the regulations. Accordingly, whenever pension is reduced below the full admissible amount, prior consultation with the Board of Directors is mandatory, irrespective of whether the power is exercised under Regulation 33(1) or Regulation 33(2).

The court reiterated that pension is not a discretionary benefit granted by the employer. Instead, it constitutes a valuable property right protected under Article 300(A) of the Constitution of India. Consequently, whenever statutory provision permits reduction of pension, every procedural safeguard enacted in favour of the employee must be strictly observed. Failure to comply with such safeguards invalidates the decision of reducing pension.

In re: Issue 3

The employer bank alternatively requested the Supreme Court to permit subsequent approval by the Board of Directors. The court while rejecting this submission held that Regulation 33 expressly requires prior consultation, which constitutes an important procedural safeguard before curtailing employees constitutional right to pension. Relying upon its earlier decision in Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Assn. v. Union of India³⁶, the court explained that prior consultation requires a genuine exchange of views before the decision is made. A subsequent rectification cannot substitute its mandatory requirement.

In re: Issue 4

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in concluding that a compulsorily retired employee is not entitled to pension unless an order is specifically passed under Regulation 33(1). According to the court such an interpretation misunderstands the purpose of the regulation. The word “may” occurring in Regulation 33(1) does not confer unrestricted discretion upon the authority to grant or refuse pension. Instead, it merely clarifies that pension can be granted only where the employee is otherwise eligible for pension upon superannuation. Thus, every employee compulsorily retired after acquiring qualifying service is entitled to pension in accordance with the regulation.

The court also rejected the employer bank’s request to invoke the extraordinary power of the court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to uphold the reduction of pension on equitable consideration. The court observed that although the bank alleged financial losses amounting to approximately Rs 3.26 crores, no evidence regarding commutation of such loss has been considered either by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that Regulations 33(1) and 33(2) must be read harmoniously and that prior consultation with the Board of Directors is mandatory prerequisite before reducing the pension of a compulsorily retired employee. Since the appellants pension was reduced without such consultation, the court declared the action illegal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and ordered the Field General Manager and granted liberty to the bank to reconsider the pension after providing the appellant an opportunity of hearing and consulting the Board of Directors. The court directed that this exercise be completed within two months, failing to which the appellant would be entitled to full pension with effect from the date of superannuation.

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(8) K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India³⁷

(Delivered on 25-7-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Surya Kant and N. Kotiswar Singh

Authored by: Justice Surya Kant

The Supreme Court in the present petition addressed the constitutional issue concerning the delimitation of legislative Constituencies following the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh. The petition questioned why the Union Government initiated delimitation in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir while excluding the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana despite Section 26, Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 (for short, “AP Reorganisation Act”), providing for an increase in the strength of their legislative assemblies.

Background of the case

The AP Reorganisation Act came into force on 2 June 2014 resulting in the creation of two successor States viz. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Section 26(1) of the Act contemplated an increase in the number of assembly seats from 175—225 for Andhra Pradesh and from 119—153 for Telangana, subject to Article 170 of the Constitution of India.

Subsequently, the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 (for short, “J&K Reorganisation Act”) recognised the former State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Section 60 of that Act similarly provided for delimitation of Constituencies.

On March 2020, the Union Government constituted a Delimitation Commission under the Delimitation Act, 2002 for Jammu and Kashmir and certain North Eastern States. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana were not included. In 2021, the notification was amended so that the delimitation exercise was confined exclusively to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission subsequently increased the assembly seats in Jammu and Kashmir from 83—90 (excluding the 24 seats reserved for Pakistan occupied Kashmir).

Aggrieved by their exclusion, the petitioners approached Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking similar delimitation for Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

The petitioners argued that Section 26, AP Reorganisation Act created a statutory obligation upon the Union Government to increase the number of assembly seats in the successor States. They contended that excluding the States from the 2020 and 2021 delimitation notifications was arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The Union Government opposed the petition by relying upon the constitutional embargo contained in Article 170(3), which postpones any readjustment of seats in State Legislative Assemblies until after publication of the figures of the first census conducted after 2026. It further argued that Jammu and Kashmir as a Union Territory, is governed by a different constitutional framework and therefore cannot be compared with States. The Election Commission also submitted that it merely implements the delimitation process prescribed by law and has no authority to question the validity of the impugned notification.

Issues before the court

The court framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the exclusion of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana from the delimitation exercise while including the UT of Jammu and Kashmir violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

2. Whether the petitioners could claim parity with the delimitation undertaken in Jammu and Kashmir.

3. Whether the failure to implement Section 26, AP Reorganisation Act gave rise to an enforceable legitimate expectation in favour of the electorates of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

Resolution of issues by the court

The court while examining Section 26, AP Reorganisation Act held that it cannot override Article 170 of the Constitution of India and that the opening words of Section 26 viz. “Subject to the provisions contained in Article 170 of the Constitution”, are decisive. These words are not merely introductory, but impose a clear constitutional limitation upon the operation of the provision. Although Section 26 contemplates an increase in assembly seats, it cannot be implemented independently of Article 170. Since Article 170(3) postpones delimitation until publication of the first census after 2026, no enforceable right therefore presently exists to seek immediate implementation of Section 26. The court observed that the constitutional provisions prevail over statutory enactment and the latter must be interpreted harmoniously with the Constitution of India.

The Supreme Court emphasised that the proviso to Article 170(3) expressly prohibits any readjustment of the number of seats of territorial Constituencies in State Legislative Assemblies until after publication of the relevant census figures following the year 2026. Consequently, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are constitutionally barred from undergoing delimitation before that stage. The court rejected the argument that Section 26 independently mandates immediate delimitation.

The court referred to the judgment of Haji Abdul Gani Khan v. Union of India³⁸ while dealing with the argument regarding the parity with Jammu and Kashmir and rejected the petitioners principal argument of discrimination by highlighting the constitutional distinction between States and Union Territories. After the J&K Reorganisation Act, the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir ceased to be governed by Chapter III of Part VI of the Constitution of India relating to State Legislatures. Instead its legislative assembly derives authority from parliamentary legislation enacted under Article 239-A. Since Article 170 does not apply to Union Territories, the constitutional freeze applicable to States has no application to Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the delimitation undertaken in Jammu and Kashmir cannot serve as a benchmark for Andhra Pradesh or Telangana.

The court also held that Article 14prohibits unreasonable discrimination, but permits classification founded upon an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Here in the present case the distinction between States and Union Territories arises directly from the Constitution itself. Consequently, the different treatment accorded to Jammu and Kashmir does not amount to hostile discrimination.

The court also undertook a detailed discussion of the doctrine of “legitimate expectation”. It observed that the doctrine protects fairness in administrative action where public authorities create a reasonable expectation through representation, policy or consistent practice. However, it cannot override express constitutional provisions. Although the petitioner’s expectation of increased representation was understandable given the provisions of the AP Reorganisation Act, such expectation cannot prevail over the constitutional embargo created by Article 170(3). Therefore, no enforceable right or justiciable cause of action arose from the alleged failure to undertake delimitation.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court finally dismissed both the writ petitions holding that the exclusion of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana from the delimitation process is constitutionally valid. Consequently, the notifications issued by the Union of India, whereby the delimitation exercise was conducted for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in an increase in the number of seats of the Legislative Assemblies were found not to be violative of Article 14.

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(9) Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India³⁹

(Delivered on 25-8-2025)

Coram: three-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta

Authored by: Justice Vikram Nath

The petition was filed before the Supreme Court concerning a question where a death sentence that had attained finality after dismissal of appeals, review petitions and mercy petitions could nevertheless be reconsidered under Article 32 of the Constitution of India because of a subsequent change in sentencing law brought by the court’s decision in Manoj v. State of M.P.⁴⁰.

The judgment does not reopen the conviction itself, instead it focuses exclusively on the constitutional validity of the sentencing process. The court emphasised that even a person sentenced to death retains the protection of Article 21 and is entitled to every procedural safeguard that ensures a fair individualised and constitutionally compliant sentencing process.

The case arose from an incident that occurred in April 2008 in Wadi, Nagpur. According to the prosecution, the petitioner lured a four-year-old girl away from her residence, took her to a scheduled location, sexually assaulted her, murdered her by strangulation and attempted to conceal her body in a nearby bushes. FIR was registered on the same date and the petitioner was arrested the next day. A chargesheet was filed for offences under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f) IPC.

The trial court convicted the petitioner and imposed the death penalty. Since he was represented through legal aid, the proceedings were affected by the absence of defence counsel, on crucial dates resulting in four important prosecution witnesses, remaining unclosed examined. Recognising this procedural deficiency, the High Court remanded the matter for the limited purpose of permitting cross-examination of those witnesses. After remanding the trial, the trial court, again convicted the petitioner and reimposed that sentence. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, and thereafter, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeal. The review petition, as well as the mercy petition submitted to the governor of Maharashtra and the President of India were also rejected.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in the Manoj case⁴¹ which introduced a structured framework for collecting mitigating material. Before imposing the death penalty, the petitioner underwent psychological assessment. This evaluation indicated a specific learning disability, low intellectual functioning, past trauma, and evidence of organic brain injury. Relying on these developments, the reconsideration of his death sentence sought on the basis of the subsequent evolution of sentencing law. The petitioner invoked Article 32 seeking reconsideration of his death sentence.

Issues before the court

The court considered the following issues for its consideration:

1. Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable to challenge the sentence of death after the conviction, review proceeding and mercy petitions have been finally dismissed.

2. Whether the principles laid down in the Manoj case apply retrospectively to persons whose death sentence had already become final.

3. Whether denial of sentencing safeguards, subsequently recognised in the Manoj case constitutes a violation of Article 21. warranting reconsideration of the sentence.

The court also revised the principles laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab⁴², Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra⁴³, which requires a trial court to collect comprehensive mitigating material viz. psychiatric evaluation, family history, educational background, socioeconomic conditions, prison conduct and rehabilitation prospects. Before deciding whether a case falls within the “rarest of the rare” category.

In re: Issue 1: Maintainability of petition under Article 32

The court held that Article 32 remains available even after a death sentence has attained finality if a subsequent development in constitutional law creates a new procedural safeguard directly affecting the prisoner’s right to life.

The court distinguishes between reopening the conviction and reconsideration of the sentencing process. It observed that the petitioner was not challenging the findings of the guilt, but seeking the benefit of a constitutional protection that did not exist when his sentence was originally imposed. Consequently the petition was held to be maintainable.

In re: Issue 2: Retrospective application of the principles in Manoj case

The court held that judicial decisions ordinarily declare what the law is and always been unless expressly limited to prospective operation. Accordingly, prisoners whose death sentences have become final are also entitled to claim the benefit of the individualised sentencing framework, if the safeguards recognised in the Manoj case, were unavailable during the sentencing proceedings.

The court reaffirmed that sentencing an accused in capital cases cannot depend solely upon the gravity of the crime. The Constitution focus must extend equally to the offender. It emphasised that courts must consider factors such as family and social background, educational and economic circumstances, mental and psychological conditions, etc. Ignoring these factors risks imposing the irreversible punishment of death without complying with constitutional standards of fairness.

In re: Issue 3

The court observed that a sentence lawfully imposed, does not extinguish every constitutional protection available to a prisoner. Even after conviction, a condemned prisoner retains the right to dignity under Article 21. Therefore, if subsequent development in law established that the sentencing process failed to satisfy constitutional requirements, the prisoner may seek an appropriate constitutional remedy. The court also explained that constitutional justice requires careful scrutiny, before State deprives any individual of life, particularly where procedural developments reveal that relevant mitigating evidence was never considered.

The court allowed the writ petition holding that while the petitioner’s conviction would remain undisturbed, the sentencing aspect required fresh consideration in light of the individualised sentencing framework laid down in the Manoj case⁴⁴, which was held to apply retrospectively. With the peculiar facts of the case, the court held that the petition under Article 32 was thus maintainable and accordingly set aside the death sentence affirmed in 2007 solely for the limited purpose of conducting a fresh hearing.

Concurring opinion of Justice Sanjay Karol

Justice Sanjay Karol, in his concurring opinion emphasised that individualised sentencing is a fundamental requirement in death penalty cases. Relying on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, he held that courts must consider all relevant mitigating circumstances, including the offender’s mental health, intellectual capacity, family background, emotional development, conduct in prison and prospects of reform, rather than focusing solely on the crime. He observed that criminal conduct is often the culmination of personal and social circumstances and ignoring such factors would undermine the fairness and completeness of the sentencing process. The constitutional guarantee of dignity under Article 21 survives even after conviction and extends to death-row prisoners, requiring courts to impose punishments that are proportionate, humane and consistent with constitutional values.

Justice Karol also held that the sentencing principles laid down in Manoj case⁴⁵ apply retrospectively, observing that judicial decisions ordinarily declare the law as it has always existed unless expressly limited. Accordingly, prisoners whose death sentences became final before Manoj case are entitled to seek reconsideration of their sentences based on the mitigating factors recognised in that judgment as denying them this benefit would violate the protection of life and dignity under Article 21. He further held that, in such exceptional circumstances, a petition under Article 32 is maintainable describing it as the Constitution‘s foremost safeguard for the enforcement of fundamental rights. However, he clarified that this remedy is confined to rare cases involving subsequent constitutional developments affecting fundamental rights and should not be treated as a general mechanism for reopening concluded criminal proceedings.

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(10) Vinod Kumar Pandey v. Seesh Ram Saini⁴⁶

(Delivered on 10-9-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale

Authored by: Justice Pankaj Mithal

The present case arose out of the appeal filed by the two officers of the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short, “CBI”) on allegations of abuse of official position, fabrication of records, intimidation and other cognizable offences.

The appellants Vinod Kumar Pandey, then an Inspector of CBI and Neeraj Kumar, then Joint Director of the CBI were officers serving on deputation to the CBI. Two separate writ petitions were instituted before the Delhi High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). One petition was filed by Vijay Agarwal, while the other was filed by Sheesh Ram Saini. Both sought directions for the registration of FIRs against the two CBI officers for various alleged offences under IPC. The allegations essentially concerned two sets of circumstances.

Allegations concerning seizure of documents

In Sheesh Ram Saini’s case it was alleged that documents had been seized by the CBI officer on 26 April, 2000, but no seizure memo was prepared on that date. The inquiry conducted subsequently by the Joint Director of the CBI itself recorded that the seizure memo had actually been prepared only on 27 April 2000.

The High Court considered this significant because the preparation of a seizure memo after the seizure, rather than contemporaneously with it was found to be inconsistent with the CBI Crime Manual. The High Court therefore considered that the matter was not merely a technical or procedural irregularity and that the allegations prima facie attracted several penal provisions.

The second set of allegations arose from the conduct of Vinod Kumar Pandey towards Vijay Agarwal. The High Court noted that Pandey had summoned Agarwal on 7 June 2001 and 11 June 2001, despite a bail order passed by the Special Judge on 27 November 2000. The allegations further included abuse, intimidation, threats and the use of vulgar language with the alleged object of compelling Vijay Agarwal to withdraw a complaint made by his brother against Neeraj Kumar. The High Court regarded these allegations as serious and as prima facie disclosing a cognizable offence.

The two writ petitions were decided by the Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court. The petitions were partly allowed and the High Court directed the Delhi Police to register cases on the basis of the respective complaints. The High Court further directed that the investigation be conducted by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police through an officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police. It also directed that the investigation should not be influenced by the findings or observations contained in the CBI’s inquiry report. The High Court was satisfied that the allegations disclosed commission cognizable offences warranting investigation. It rejected the CBI inquiry officer’s conclusion that no cognizable offence had been made out, holding that the truthfulness of serious allegations could not properly be determined at the stage of preliminary inquiry. The two CBI officers challenged the Single Judge decision before the Division Bench through letters patent appeals (for short, “LPAs”) which dismissed the letters patent appeals on the ground of maintainability. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court of India.

Decision of the Supreme Court

1. Prima facie cognizable offences were disclosed

The court found that the High Court had examined the complaints and the available material in considerable detail and had reached the conclusion that cognizable offences were prima facie disclosed. In relation to the seizure of documents, the High Court had relied upon the fact that the CBI’s own inquiry report confirmed that the seizure memo was prepared a day after the documents had allegedly been seized. The Supreme Court accepted that this was a matter requiring investigation rather than something that could simply be dismissed as a procedural irregularity.

With regard to Vijay Agarwal, the allegations against Vinod Kumar Pandey included summoning him despite the existing bail order and using intimidation and threats allegedly to secure withdrawal of the complaint against Neeraj Kumar. The court considered the allegations sufficiently serious to warrant investigation. The court also noted that whether Vinod Kumar Pandey had acted at the behest of Neeraj Kumar or whether the two officers had acted in connivance was essentially a question of fact requiring investigation.

Registration of FIR and the role of preliminary inquiry

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the relationship between a preliminary inquiry and the registration of an FIR. The court relied upon Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat⁴⁷, observing that allegations concerning abuse of official position and corrupt practices by public servants disclose cognizable offences. Where the information reveals a cognizable offence, the police is required under Section 154 CrPC to register an FIR. The court treated the CBI’s report as a preliminary inquiry report. It also held that such a report cannot ordinarily be treated as a conclusive determination that no offence has been committed. A Constitutional Court is not prevented from forming its own prima facie view on the basis of the complaints and material before it. This reasoning is particularly important because the High Court had not simply ignored the CBI report, rather it had examined it and disagreed with its conclusion. The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with that approach.

The appellants also argued that the complainants had not followed the appropriate statutory procedure before approaching the High Court. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the High Court should ordinarily discourage writ petitions or petitions under Section 482 CrPC where an effective alternative remedy exists. However, relying upon Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P.⁴⁸, the court reiterated that the existence of an alternative remedy does not constitute an absolute bar to exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. The court also referred to Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi)⁴⁹, where it was held that the existence of an alternative remedy cannot be used as a reason for refusing registration of a criminal case where the complaint discloses a cognizable offence. Further, relying on the judgment of Anurag Bhatnagar v. State (NCT of Delhi)⁵⁰, the court held that approaching a court without first exhausting alternative remedies may constitute a procedural irregularity, but not necessarily an illegality where the court possesses jurisdiction to direct registration of an FIR in appropriate cases.

The court in this case also reiterated an important principle concerning the registration of FIRs: The police is not required to determine the genuineness or credibility of the information before registering an FIR when the information discloses a cognizable offence. The court relied upon Ramesh Kumari case for the proposition that the genuineness or credibility of the information is not a condition precedent for registration of an FIR, which questions can properly be examined during investigation.

Conclusion

The court ultimately declined to interfere with the High Court decision directing the registration of an FIR. However, it modified the High Court’s directions in the following significant respects:

1. The investigation would be conducted by the Delhi Police rather than the Special Cell, through an officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police.

2. The CBI inquiry report could be considered during investigation, but would not be treated as conclusive.

3. The investigating officer would remain uninfluenced by observations made by either the High Court or the Supreme Court.

4. The investigation was directed to be completed as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months, considering the age of the matter.

***

(11) State of Haryana v. Jai Singh⁵¹

(Delivered on 16-9-2025)

Coram: three-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, Prashant Kumar Mishra and K.V. Viswanathan

Authored by: Justice B.R. Gavai

The appeal arose from the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, whereby the High Court partly allowed the writ petitions preferred by the landowners challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 as amended in February 1992 after the Presidential assent. Through this amendment, Section 2(g)(6), was added, which read thus:

“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-

xxx xxx xxx

(g) “shamilat deh” includes-

xxx xxx xxx

(6) lands reserved for the common purposes of a village under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the management and control whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat under Section 23-A of the aforesaid Act.

Explanation – Lands entered in the column of ownership of record of rights as “Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab Rasad”, “Jumla Malkan” or “Mushtarka Malkan” shall be shamilat deh within the meaning of this section.”⁵²

The aforesaid provision was challenged on the ground that the amendments were violative of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India, which challenge was accepted by the writ court and writ petitions were allowed striking down the amendment. The Supreme Court in appeal remanded the matter back to the High Court for reconsideration of various issues and passing a fresh judgment. The Full Bench thereafter examined the legality of the amending provisions and again partly allowed the writ petitions preferred by the landowners. This again led the State taking the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court initially, through its judgment initially passed in April 2022 set aside the view of the High Court holding that entire land reserved for common purposes by applying a pro-rata cut had to be utilised by the Gram Panchayat (for short, “GP”) for the present and future needs of the village community and no part of the land can be repartitioned among the proprietors. A review petition came to be filed which was allowed in May 2024, wherein the earlier judgment allowing the civil appeals came to be recalled and set aside.

Discussion about the earlier Constitution Bench judgments of the Supreme Court

Before proceeding to analyse the submissions, the court referred to the three Constitution Bench judgments, in light of which the controversy had to be decided, viz. Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab⁵³, Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab⁵⁴, and Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab.⁵⁵ In all these cases by virtue of land pooling and consolidation proceedings, portions of land from the lands owned by the landowners were acquired and without payment of compensation for the same, taken away and put in the common pool. The Constitution Bench in Ranjit Singh case thereafter held that transfer of “shamilat deh” owned by the proprietors to the Village Panchayat for the purposes of management and conferral of common proprietor rights was not ultra vires Article 31 and therefore no compensation was payable. The judgment of the High Court was rendered without considering the effect of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of India, which had inserted the second proviso to Article 31-A. The court observed that therefore the judgment of Ranjit Singh case will not have any bearing on the present matter.

Undertaking the discussion about another Constitution Bench judgment in the Ajit Singh case, the challenge was mounted on the ground that compensation must be paid to the appellant in accordance with the provisions of amended Article 31-A(1). The Constitution Bench in the case of Ajit Singh case therefore considered whether part-extinguishment of ownership rights in an estate to the State by transferring the same in favour of the State would fall within the meaning and expression – “acquisition by the State of an estate”. The Constitution Bench in Ajit Singh case distinguished between two concepts, viz. “acquisition by the State” and the other being “modification or extinguishment of rights”. In the latter case, the beneficiary of the modification or extinguishment was not the State. The expression “acquisition by the State of any estate” occurring under Article 31-A means and includes transfer of the ownership or right to possession of an estate to the State. The word “acquisition” has a wide connotation meaning the procurement of property or taking of it permanently or temporarily. It may not necessarily imply the acquisition of legal title by the State in the property taken possession of. Therefore, what is to be seen is the substance and practical result of the act of the State, rather than purely the legal aspect. The majority in the Ajit Singh case held that therefore the test is that there should be substantial deprivation, a deprivation which substantially robs a man of those attributes of enjoyment of property which normally accompany rights to or interest in the property. If the State in substance acquires all the rights in the land for its own purposes, even if the title remains with the owner, it falls under the category of acquisition within the second proviso to Article 31-A.

Where however the landowners are deprived of a small bit, and instead of the same, they are given advantages in a much larger area of land which he could have never got apart from the land pooling/consolidation scheme in the acquired land so reserved for common purposes, then there is no acquisition by the State within the second proviso to Article 31-A. It is merely an adjustment of the rights of persons holding the land under their personal cultivation in the interest of the village economy, which may not qualify as acquisition. The land so acquired is used for the common needs and benefit of the estate or estates concerned. The formation of a common pool so that the whole area may be used for the common needs and benefit of the estate mentioned above ensures that the said land could not be used for any other purpose. The proprietors because they also enjoy the benefits at par with others cannot be treated to have parted with their property under an acquisition exercise.

Discussing thereafter the third Constitution Bench judgement in the matter of Bhagat Ram case⁵⁶ , the court observed that the challenge was relatable to the reservation of land for income of Panchayat and whether such a reservation amounted to acquisition of land by the State under Article 31-A. The Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram case held that reservation of 100 kanals and 2 marlas of land pooled in by the private landowners for the income of the Panchayat was an acquisition contrary to the scheme of Article 31-A. In the facts, situation at hand, the management and control not only vested with the Panchayat, but the rights of the holders were also not modified or extinguished.

Consideration and analysis by the Supreme Court

After discussing all the three judgments of the Constitution Benches, the Full Bench of the High Court drew a distinction between the land reserved for common purposes under Section 18(c) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 which became part and parcel of the scheme, which was not put to any common use in present time, but would have been put to common use at a later point of time. It also undertook discussion about the lands which might have been contributed by the proprietors on a pro rata basis, but were not reserved or earmarked for common purposes in the scheme. Drawing the distinction between both the categories of land, one which had been put to common use in present time and which were not, the Full Bench held that in the case of former, Article 31-A would not leave them unconstitutional, but in the case of latter it would amount to compulsory acquisition without payment of compensation and thereby offend the second proviso to Article 31-A.

The Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by the Full Bench which was held to be in conformity with the judgments of Ajit Singh case and Bhagat Ram case. The Full Bench relied upon the earlier judgment of the Division Bench of the same High Court in Gurjant Singh v. State of Punjab.⁵⁷ All these judgments had held consistently that land which remains unutilised after utilising the land for the common purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme vests with the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat. The left-over land after utilising the land earmarked for common purposes must be redistributed amongst the proprietors according to the share in which they had contributed the land belonging to them for common purposes.

Thus, applying the doctrine of stare decisis to the facts of the present case, the Supreme Court held that considering the stability and predictability in the legal system, a view which has consistently been upheld by the courts over a long period of time must be followed, unless it is manifestly erroneous. Referring to the judgments in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay⁵⁸ and Waman Rao v. Union of India⁵⁹ the Supreme Court reiterated that a view which has remained undisturbed for a long passage of time, must be allowed to hold the field and treated as binding by applying the law of precedents. Accordingly applying the doctrine of stare decisis as well, the Supreme Court affirmed the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court. It dismissed all the appeals of the State finding no merit in them.

***

(12) Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra⁶⁰

(Delivered on 6-11-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ and Augustine George Masih

Authored by Justice Augustine G. Masih

The Supreme Court in the present appeal clarified the constitutional and procedural safeguards relating to arrest under Article 221 of the Constitution of India and Section 47 BNSS (formerly Section 50 CrPC). It examined “whether an arrested person must invariably be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing and whether failure to do so renders the arrest illegal”.

Factual matrix of the case

The leading case in the present appeals arose from a fatal road accident that occurred in July 2024 in Mumbai. According to the prosecution a Bavarian Motor Works (BMW) allegedly driven by the appellant collided with a scooter carrying the complainant and his wife. The impact threw both victims onto the vehicle. While the complainant was thrown aside, his wife became trapped beneath the front wheel and bumper of the car. Instead of stopping to assist, the driver allegedly continued driving, dragging the victim for some distance before abandoning the vehicle and fleeing. The victim later succumbed to her injuries, while the complainant sustained minor injuries. An FIR was registered under the relevant provisions of the BNS and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. During investigation, CCTV footage, FASTag records, evidence regarding consumption of alcohol shortly before the incident, attempts to alter appearance and recovery of the damaged vehicle allegedly established the appellant’s direct involvement. The appellant was arrested, while another accused had already been arrested on the date of the incident.

The appellant challenged the legality of his arrest on the ground that although he had been arrested and remanded to custody, he was never supplied with the grounds of arrest in writing. Thereby violating his fundamental rights, provided under Article 221 of the Constitution of India and Section 47 BNS.

The HC acknowledged that written grounds had not been supplied, but nevertheless upheld the arrest, observing that the appellant was fully aware of the allegations against him and that overwhelming evidence justified his custody. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Issues before the court

The court framed the following issues for its consideration:

1. Whether every person arrested for offences under the BNS must invariably be furnished with the grounds of arrest.

2. Whether failure to communicate the grounds of arrest immediately or at the time of arrest particularly in exceptional circumstances would invalidate the arrest for violation of Article 2211 and Section 47 BNS.

Constitutional and statutory framework

The court undertook an extensive examination of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. It observed that Article 21 protects personal liberty against arbitrary State action, while Article 22(1) supplements this protection by requiring that every arrested person be informed as soon as possible of the grounds of arrest and be afforded the right to consult a legal practitioner.

The court further explained that constitutional protection is implemented through Section 47 (requiring communication of the grounds of arrest); Section 48 (requiring police to inform a relative or a friend about the arrest); Section 38 (permits access to legal counsel during interrogation); Section 187 (governing, remand proceedings before the Magistrate) BNSS. According to the court, these provisions collectively insure meaningful protection of personal liberty.

Purpose of communicating grounds of arrest

The court emphasised that informing accused the grounds of arrest is not a mere procedural formality, but a substantive constitutional safeguard. Communication of the grounds enables the arrested person to understand allegations; obtain legal advice; challenge the legality of arrest; oppose police; demand and seek bail effectively. Without such knowledge, these constitutional protections become illusory.

The court by referring to the judgment of Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India⁶¹, recognised that merely reading out lengthy grounds of arrest, may be ineffective, because an arrested person is often under stress and may not remember the content. Furnishing written grounds eliminates disputes regarding compliance and enables meaningful legal defence.

The court further referred to the judgment of Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)⁶², which verdict extended this principle beyond the PMLA and held that every arrested person, irrespective of the offence involved possesses both a constitutional and statutory right to receive written grounds of arrest.

The court further considered the judgment of Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana⁶³ and explained that although the Constitution does not expressly use the word “effective communication” consistent with Article 22, but ordinarily requires written communication in order to achieve the constitutional purpose. The Court, while referring to these judgments, discussed the far-reaching consequences of arrest. Arrest damages an individual’s reputation, affects mental and emotional being, imposes social stigma and restricts liberty even before guilt is established. The Supreme Court while referring to its earlier decision in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar⁶⁴ and Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.⁶⁵, reiterated that arrest should never become a routine exercise of police power and must always be justified by necessity.

The court recognised that exceptional situations may arise, where immediate written communication is practically impossible. Illustratively, where a police officer directly witnesses a serious cognizable offence, such as murder and immediate arrest becomes necessary to prevent escape, it may not be feasible to hand over written grounds at the exact moment of his arrest. However, the court made it clear that such situations are exceptional. They cannot become ordinary and written grounds must still be supplied at the earliest possible opportunity after arrest in such cases, before the remand proceedings so that the accused can effectively defend himself. Thus, practical difficulties cannot be used to dilute constitutional guarantees.

The Supreme Court while analysing all its previous decisions and the steady framework held that:

1. informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional obligation;

2. this obligation applies to every arrest, irrespective of the statute involved;

3. the grounds must ordinarily be furnished in writing and in a language understood by the arrested person;

4. failure to comply with this requirement ordinarily renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal because it violates Articles 20, 21 and 22(1); and

5. only genuine and unavoidable practical exigencies may justify a brief delay, but written grounds must still be supplied promptly before the remand not beyond two hours before the arrest.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court thus affirmed that personal liberty cannot be curtailed, except through strict adherence to constitutional safeguards. By requiring these grounds of arrest ordinarily to be communicated in writing and language understood by the arrested person, the court ensured that the right to legal representation; the opportunity to challenge detention and the protection against arbitrary arrest remains effective rather than merely symbolic.

***

(13) Samiullah v. State of Bihar⁶⁶

(Delivered on 7-11-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi

Authored by: Justice P.S. Narasimha

The appeals before the Supreme Court pertained to the validity of Bihar Registration Rules, 2008 (for short, “Registration Rules”), specifically, Rule 19(xvii) and (xviii), which empowered registering authorities to refuse registration of documents if proof of mutation of the property under sale in favour of the vendor is not produced along with the registering document. The Supreme Court in the process of adjudication expanded the rights associated with the freedom to freely acquire, possess and dispose of property; the contours of the same and the extent to which restrictions can be imposed by the State. The Rules under challenge were impugned as being ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69, Registration Act.

Factual matrix of the case

The Patna High Court dismissed the writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Rules in question, which were introduced through the 2019 amendment. The relevant extract of the Rules read as follows:

“Rule 19. Refusal of Duly Presented Document – A duly presented document may be refused for registration under the following circumstances—

(i) If the description or identification of the property, as defined in Rule 5, has not been given as required under the Act and Rules.

(ii) If the executant denies execution. (Section 35)

(iii) If the executant fails to appear and admit execution. (Section 34)

(iv) If the person by whom the document purported to have been executed is dead and his representative or assign denies execution. (Section 35)

(v) If the person purporting to have executed the document appears to be a minor, an idiot, or a lunatic. (Section 35)

(vi) If the Registering Officer is not satisfied by the identity of the person appearing before him claiming that he has executed the document. (Section 35)

Provided that a document shall not be refused under this clause unless the party fails to prove his identity within the time allowed under Section 34.

(vii) If the Registering Officer is not satisfied of the truth of the allegation that the person who executed the document is dead. (Section 35)

Provided that a document shall not be refused for registration under this clause unless the party fails to prove the death of the executant within the time allowed under Section 34.

(viii) If the admitting agent’s power of attorney has not been made in accordance with the Act, or if any alleged representative or assign has failed to prove his status. (Section 35)

(ix) If the parties fail or refuse to mention the additions of executants and claimants.

(x) If the prescribed fee or fine has not been paid under Sections 25, 34, and 80 of the Act.

(xi) If a document is said to be executed by a deaf and dumb person who does not understand the transaction nor express himself by signs or in writing.

(xii) Where a person admits his signature to a document but states that he signed the paper when it was blank and no document was written thereon.

(xiii) …

……

(xvi) [-]

[Provided further that it will not affect the registration of units/flats of those multi-storied buildings/apartments of which at least one unit/flat has been registered before the Bihar Registration (Amendment) Rules, 2018, notified on 30.08.2018, came into force.]

[(xvii) If a document is related to the sale/gift of property, in which Jamabandi allotment to the seller/donor is not mentioned in the deed and no proof is produced about the Jamabandi allotment to the seller/donor.

Provided that it will have no effect on the document related to the transfer of a flat/apartment.

(xviii) If a document is related to the sale/gift of property, in which holding allotment to the seller/donor of the flat/apartment in an urban region is not mentioned in the deed and no proof is produced about the holding allotment to the seller/donor.

Provided that it will have no effect on the document related to the first transfer of a flat/apartment.]”⁶⁷

The effect of the impugned amended sub-rules was that the registering authority can refuse registration of an otherwise validly presented document on the ground that it did not mention and carry the proof of Jamabandi allotment or holding allotment in favor of the seller. Thereby procurement and production of Jamabandi or holding allotment certificate under the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011 became compulsory as a condition precedent for the sale or transfer of immovable property. It is this provision that led to filing of writ petitions by the aggrieved sellers and purchasers before the High Court, who contended that since the process of land surveys is still incomplete in the State of Bihar, it is impossible for owners to obtain Jamabandi or holding allotments for the execution of sale deeds. Further requirement of mutation being a revenue exercise which does not even confer/create title cannot be linked with the execution of sale deed or registration of the transfer deed in question.

The Division Bench of the Patna High Court repelled the challenge holding essentially that the provisions of the Act as well as the Rules mandate a clear description of the property for the purpose of registration and therefore impugned amendments fall within the ambit of requirements. The public policy considerations behind the impugned amendment do not impair the prescription in the amended Rules.

Consideration and analysis by the court

The court then proceeded to consider the challenge to the Rules in question. Referring to the dichotomy between clauses (i) to (xvi) on one hand sub-rule (xvii) on the other rule (xviii), the court observed that the former category of clauses are relatable either to the identity of the property, or the condition or the conduct of the executant. If the registering officer is not satisfied with the identity of the property or the death of the executant or other such contingencies, then for want of satisfaction about the identity of the property, of the seller/executant, the registration may be refused. On the other hand, the impugned sub-rules (xvii) and (xviii) are qualitatively distinct from all the earlier sub-rules, prescribing the precondition of proof of the transaction of the registrable property under another statute, viz., the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011. This requirement of proof by way of Jamabandi and holding allotment is therefore starkly different from the existing sub-rules introducing an altogether new condition for registration of property.

The court then discussed the scope of rule-making powers available under Section 69 with the Inspector-General (for short, “IG”) as part of supervisory responsibilities. However, the Rules are expected to be consistent with the provisions of the Act and nothing under Section 69 enables the Inspector-General to frame such Rules requiring declaration or enclosing proof of mutation in favour of the vendor as a condition precedent for registration of documents of sale of property.

The court also analysed other provisions of the Act, viz. Sections 3—16-A, Parts IV, V and VI, after undertaking detailed examination of which it concluded that the only requirement postulated under the parent act is the requirement of sufficient description and identity of the property. The other provisions of the parent act at the highest enable reference to maps, plans or surveys, but none of them requires reference to a production of proof of mutation in the name of the owner as a precondition for registration of the property. Such a condition also does not relate to the right of the disposition of the executant, if the property is otherwise physically identifiable. The Rules under Section 69(1)(j) can be made for the general purpose of “regulating the proceedings of Registrars and Sub-Registrars”, which cannot in any way relate to imposition of precondition of mutation with respect to the subject property. The impugned rules were therefore held to be ultra vires the rule-making power conferred by Section 69 or other provisions of the parent act.

The court then dealt with the serious concerns arising out of the implementation of the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011. The court then examined the factual scenario and the ground reality present in Bihar with respect to status of mutations, survey and settlements. 80 per cent Jamabandis were found to have not been updated. It recorded that 95 to 98 per cent of the persons in whose names Jamabandi runs are dead and even their (LRs) up to two to three generations are no more. The status of computerisation is also at the initial stages. Thus, there is a big missing link in the whole process of mutation and the process of survey and settlement are nowhere near completion.

The court therefore held that interlinking of the revenue and mutation process with the registration one, thereby restraining it till the Jamabandi or holding allotment is effected would be ex facie illegal since requirement under the rules which therefore impedes or restrains easy and effective transfer of property will be illegal as it has the direct effect of deprivation of property. The delay caused in the updation of Jamabandi and holding records are unreasonable and arbitrary, not attributable to the landowner. Imposition of such restrictions are therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.

The court then discussed the dichotomy between registration and title stating that Registration Act mandates registration of documents, not the title and this distinction is the fundamental character of our country’s presumptive titling system through registration. Registration of documents regarding purchase of immovable property does not confer guaranteed title or ownership but only serves as a public record of the transaction having presumptive evidentiary value. It can never be conclusive proof of ownership. Because “land” is a state subject under Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, the procedures therefore vary from state to state and are highly fragmented.

Ramping up technology and digitised records

The court then discussed the efforts made by the government to modernise these transactions by adopting various technological measures quoting the celebrated statement — “No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not only the world as it is, but the world as it will be”. In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the civil appeals, thereby setting aside the view taken by the Patna High Court declaring the rules under challenge as ultra vires the parent statute and resultantly unconstitutional in nature.

***

(14) Shanti Construction (P) Ltd. v. State of Odisha⁶⁸

(Delivered on 7-11-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe

Authored by: Justice Alok Aradhe

The appeals arose from the judgment of Orissa High Court, which dismissed the writ petitions. The writ petitions involved the issue of interpretation of the term “previous financial year” as defined under Rule 27(4)(iv), Odisha Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 (for short, “Rules of 2016”).

Factual matrix of the case

Tahsildar, Cuttack issued a notice inviting tender (NIT) for extraction of sand on a lease for a period of five years of a sand quarry. In response to the NIT, 20 bidders submitted their bid, wherein H1 bidder submitted their bid quoting the highest rate for a period of five years of Rs 2,127.27 per cubic meter and the successful bidder submitted their bid quoting rate of Rs 1250 per cubic meter. The bid of H1 bidder was however declared as non-responsive and rejected on the ground that he failed to comply with the provision of Rule 27(4)(iv), Rules of 2016 by not submitting the income tax returns (for short, “ITR”) for the Financial Year 2021-2022. The successful bidder however on the other hand had submitted the ITR for the said financial year, which was found to be technically responsive. The successful bidder (the one who had quoted Rs 1250 per cubic meter) completed the necessary formalities for the execution of the contract in pursuance of the successful bid, including the advance deposit of the lease amount. The auction proceedings came to be challenged at the instance of the unsuccessful bidder, which dismissed the writ petition quoting the non-compliance of the bidder with the provisions of Rules of 2016 on its failure to submit the ITR of the requisite financial year. Resultantly the unsuccessful bidder approached the Supreme Court, which initially granted interim relief of maintaining status quo in relation to the contract in question. The unsuccessful bidder contended essentially that tender was floated in the middle of the year immediately succeeding the financial year for which ITR was insisted upon and thus they had filed the provisional balance sheet for the Financial Year 2021-2022. The last date for filing the ITR of the immediately succeeding year was 31 October 2022 and therefore Rule 27(4)(iv) of the Rules of 2016 could not have been interpreted to impose a requirement of submission of ITR for the Financial Year 2021-2022. The High Court failed to appreciate this sensitivity of the matter when the ITRs of previous five years preceding the year of auction were duly submitted.

Consideration and analysis by the court

The court observed that “heart beat of fair play” in tender matters is non-arbitrariness and fairness in state action. Wherever decision-making is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, mala fide or contrary to public interest, the court is compelled to interfere. Relying on the judgment of Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka⁶⁹, Banshidhar Construction (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.⁷⁰ and Tata Cellular v. Union of India⁷¹, the Supreme Court reiterated that principles of restraint on interference in contractual matters of the state is accompanied by an equally strong duty to intervene in decision-making process if the same appears to be irrational and perverse. This is because public tender is not a private bargain, but an instrument of governance through which state discharges its solemn duty as trustee of public wealth. Whenever an interpretation of a tender condition narrows competition and excludes the highest bidder on a ground unsupported by law the decision-making process gets vitiated. The interpretation of the terms of tender must therefore serve the object and purpose of the tender mainly to maximise the revenue to the State, more so whenever it is dealing with a natural resource. The court then referred to the provisions of Rule 27(4)(iv), Rules of 2016, which on the date of auction read as follows:

“(iv) income tax return of previous financial year showing annual income for an amount not less than the amount of additional charge offered and the royalty payable for the minimum guaranteed quantity for one whole year or bank guarantee valid for a period of eighteen months for the amount not less than the amount as above.”

Clause 5 of the auction notice which substantially incorporated the aforesaid Rule 27(4)(iv) read as follows:

“5. As per the provisions of Section 27(4)(iv) for of the OMMC Rules 2016, the applicant has to deposit the equivalent amount of the royalty against the minimum guaranteed period quantity (MGQ) and the proposed additional charges or a bank guarantee of more than that amount valid for next 18 months or the income tax return of the previous financial year. Bank guarantee > MGQ X (Royalty + offered Additional Charge).”

Interpreting both Rule 27(4)(iv) read with Clause 5, the Supreme Court observed that admittedly the auction notice was issued in the midst of the year in July 2022. The phrase “previous financial year” therefore assumed critical importance, as it had to be read necessarily in harmony with the provisions of Income-Tax Act, 1961 (for short, “IT Act”). Vide Section 139(1), IT Act, the company was allowed to file their ITR for the Financial Year 2021-2022 up to 31st October 2022. The last date of bid submission was 18 July 2022, and thus the period for filing the ITR for the Financial Year 2021-2022 was yet to expire. On the said date, therefore the bidder could not have been expected to file an ITR for Financial Year 2021-2022 along with its bid documents, when the statutory period for filing the same had not expired.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that reasonable understanding of the term “previous financial year” would therefore mean the year immediately preceding Financial Year 2020-21, for which admittedly the unsuccessful bidder had filed the ITRs. The term “previous financial year” in the case of unsuccessful bidder was to be treated as Financial Year 2020-2021 and not 2021-2022, which interpretation is also in consonance with the provisions of Section 139(1), IT Act. The tender committee was therefore held to have proceeded on a narrow and unreasonable interpretation of the said phrase, which defeated the very purpose of the tender. It undermined the principle in public auctions that State must always act to enhance and not diminish the public exchequer. The High Court also overlooked the aforesaid view, and impugned judgment was held to be contrary to law.

Nature of relief to be granted to the unsuccessful bidder

The Supreme Court then adverted to the relief which ought to be granted to the parties in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, since already three years had lapsed out of the total period of five years. No material was available before the Supreme Court to indicate the present rate of sand per cubic meter, but upward trend in the movement of prices of sand was visible. The successful bidder was also ready and willing to match the rate offered by the unsuccessful bidder. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, therefore the Supreme Court not only set aside the judgment of the High Court, but also directed the Tahsildar, Cuttack to issue a fresh auction notice for grant of lease of extraction of sand over the subject area. The State was also directed to refund the amount deposited by the successful bidder within 30 days along with 6 per cent interest from the date of deposit. The special leave petition was accordingly disposed of.

***

(15) Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra⁷²

(Decided on 7-11-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale

Authored by: Justice Vikram Nath

The batch of civil appeals arose from the judgment of the Bombay High Court, which declined to interfere with the revenue mutations and annotations that described the subject lands as affected by forest proceedings and having vested in the State under the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975. The High Court held that since the notices were issued directing eviction of the landowners in 1960 and thereafter published in the Official Gazette, there was sufficient foundation to treat the lands as private forests under the acquisition regime.

The opening remarks of the judgment elucidate the significance of Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India, whereunder the law laid down by the Supreme Court binds every court in the country and also obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to act in aid of the Supreme Court. Judicial discipline was described as a necessary ethic which turns hierarchy into harmony, requiring courtesy, restraint and obedience to binding precedents even where a judge is personally unpersuaded.

Factual matrix of the case

The Forest Act, 1927, as adapted and applicable in the erstwhile State of Bombay and in the State of Maharashtra contained Chapter V which dealt with control over forests and lands not being the property of Government. By virtue of various provisions, viz. Section 34-A and 35, the State Government was empowered by notification in the Official Gazette to vest the lands under its title and name. The Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975, which follows the Forest Act, 1927, defined “private forests”, which are not the property of the Government and vesting of such private forests in the State Government, followed by power of the State to take over physical possession of such lands.

The appellants were the landowners in the State of Maharashtra, and the State contended that in the early 1960’s, notices were issued under Section 35 Forest Act, 1927, which were thereafter published in the Official Gazette. However, the service of notices on the landowners followed by due inquiry on their objections and passing of formal orders on such objections never took place. By virtue of the operation of the subsequently enacted Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975, the lands got vested with the State on issuance of notices and their publication in the Gazette. The State authorities in 2001 thereafter initiated administrative exercises of identifying the lands vested under their name, title and recording of entries in the revenue records in the name of the State as its own owner. When the State was recorded as the owner of these village lands, the landowners were never noticed or informed. To the contrary, they remained in continuous undisturbed possession of the same and no award of compensation was also made.

In the earlier round, the challenge to these revenue recordings travelled up to the Supreme Court, wherein the High Court took the view that vesting with the State on publication of the Official Gazette was automatic. In appeal the Supreme Court in the earlier rounds took a view that provisions of Section 2(f) Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 saved only “live or pipeline notices”, those issued and pursued in reasonable proximity to 30 August 1975; the State was obliged to act within a reasonable time and notices left undecided for years cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day. It further held that lands which had been used for private purposes by the landowners for long could not be subjected to unfair and unreasonable disputes on prolonged State inaction, where State itself facilitated and acquiesced in development over decades. Equities of third-party purchasers and residents, State’s prolonged delay and practical impossibility of restoration militated against acceptance of contentions of the State Government. This judgment by the Supreme Court was delivered in the matter of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra⁷³, followed thereafter in Pitamber v. State of Maharashtra⁷⁴, Sinhagad Technical Education Society v. DY. Conservator of Forest⁷⁵, Ozone Land Agro (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra⁷⁶ and host of other judgments and followed consistently in the subsequent judgments by the Bombay High Court.

However, in the case of the present appellants whose matter travelled to the Supreme Court, the facts were similar to those of the various petitioners in the different judgments of the High Court as well as those in Godrej & Boyce case. But the High Court through its judgment under challenge dismissed all the writ petitions and coincidentally one of the members of the Division Bench of the High Court had authored the earlier judgment in Oberoi Constructions (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra⁷⁷ (judgment of the Bombay High Court in the previous round).

The High Court in the judgment under challenge framed the primary issue as to whether Godrej & Boyce case applied to the litigation at hand or not. The High Court accepting the State’s case held that notices were issued and served under Section 35(3), Forest Act, 1927 and notification under Section 35(1), Forest Act, 1927 was in force before the appointed day. The facts leading up to the judgment of Godrej & Boyce case were distinguished by the High Court as being different to the litigation at hand. It further opined that most of the petitioners were subsequent purchasers who came into scene long after August 1975, and therefore lacked locus to challenge the issuance and service of notices under Section 35(3), Forest Act, 1927 without affidavits from the original owners or contemporaneous material. Therefore, the burden of proof was not effectively discharged.

Consideration and analysis by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held the impugned judgment of the High Court to be unsustainable and contrary to the settled legal position. Interpreting Section 2(f)(iii) read with Section 3 of the Maharashtra Forests Act, it held that it comprehends due service on the owner because service alone triggers the owner’s right to object. A notice which grants time for objections to the landowners cannot coexist and be contemporaneous with the final notification under Section 35 of the Forest Act, 1927 and be published in the same Gazette, one below the other. Therefore, the whole process was nothing but illusory in nature. The Supreme Court further found that actual possession had throughout remained with the private owners, a position which was reflected also in the revenue records describing them as occupants. There was no proof of service of any of the notices issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act, 1927 on the erstwhile owners, nor is there any proof of taking over of possession physically or payment of compensation to them. Therefore vesting under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Forests Act never took place. Article 300-A of the Constitution of India requires that no person should be deprived of any property owned by him save by authority of law and when a statute prescribes a manner of doing a thing it must be done in that manner or not at all. Several mandatory steps were absent in the present case and therefore even a single missing step defeated the individual vesting with the State.

Subsequent purchasers cannot be prejudiced by undisclosed proceedings, which they had no means to discover, more so when the revenue entries continue to carry the names of the private owners which indicate that even the State never treated these lands as vested forests. Therefore, it could not be held that a subsequent purchaser stands in a worse-off position than the one who developed the land as it would invert the logic of the statute and would reward illegality while penalizing restraint.

The impugned judgment of the High Court was therefore held to have been premised upon misreading of both the Forest Act, 1927 as well as the Maharashtra Forests Act as a whole. The Court then further observed that there is no legally relevant distinction between the present litigation and the judgment earlier delivered in Godrej & Boyce case. The ratio in Godrej & Boyce case turned upon the service of notices under Section 35(3), Forest Act, 1927; strict compliance with the statutory steps that alone can support vesting under Section 3; and issuance of final notification by the State. The fact that some of the appellants are subsequent purchasers does not diminish the requirement of service and other statutory preconditions. Even in the judgment of Godrej & Boyce case many parties were not original owners, yet the controlling principles applied uniformly.

Criticising the High Court’s approach, the Supreme Court observed that it was a clear attempt to avoid a binding precedent rather than to apply it and the reasoning rested on a misreading of the Gazette publication. The court held that whenever a judgment minimises a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts, it creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent. Such an approach conveys a measure of pettiness, inconsistent with the detachment that judicial reasoning demands.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed all the appeals setting aside the High Court judgment.

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(16) Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India⁷⁸

(Delivered on 19-11-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K. Vinod Chandran

Authored by: Justice B.R. Gavai

The judgment pertained to validity of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, which also highlighted the continuing constitutional dialogue on the structure, independence and functioning of tribunals. It starts with an illuminating quote of Dr B.R. Ambedkar on limitations to be understood by all those who are working the Constitution, viz. the three wings of the polity, the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. The challenge in the writ petition was to the constitutionality of various provisions of the Tribunals Act, specifically the provisions pertaining to Central Government being given primacy in the appointment of Search-cum-Selection Committee; the provisions empowering the Central Government to frame rules prescribing the salary, allowances and other monetary benefits admissible to the chairperson and members of the Tribunal; the shortened tenure of various members of the Tribunal and other such provisions.

Tribunalisation and its jurisprudence up to the judgment of Madras Bar Association (4)

The Court undertook the comprehensive discussion giving full picture of the case, tracing the historical trajectory, leading up to the impugned enactment as part of shaping of the current dispute before the Court. Referring to the judgments of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India⁷⁹ and R.K. Jain v. Union of India⁸⁰, the Supreme Court observed that whenever any class of disputes are being transferred from the High Courts to tribunals, then the latter should be a real substitute of the High Court not only in form and de jure, but also in content and de facto. The selection of the members of the Tribunal must be done by a committee/panel of Supreme Court Judges.

Referring thereafter to the judgments of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India⁸¹, Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn. (MBA (I) case)⁸², the court underscored that without comprehensive reform, ensuring structural independence in appointments, funding and administration, Indian Tribunals will continue to remain quasi-executive bodies rather than quasi-judicial bodies. For tribunals to be truly fulfilling their constitutional purpose, they have to be institutionally independent. They must possess the independence, security and capacity associated in the same manner as it is associated with the regular courts of law. There is no need of having any non-judicial Technical Members in Tribunals where tribunal tries cases transferred simpliciter from courts to it only for the purposes of expediting the hearing, swift disposal or relieving the courts from the rigours of the Evidence Act, 1872, and procedural laws. Inclusion of Technical Members is justified only when specialised expertise is essential for disposal of cases coming before the Tribunal. Therefore, provisions pertaining to establishment of tribunal enacted by the legislature are always subject to judicial review for examining whether members are qualified to discharge judicial functions and uphold public confidence. Independence and impartial adjudication of citizen disputes free from executive control is an essential facet of the rule of law and a core element of judicial independence under the Constitution. They must not erode judicial standards or the separation of powers.

Referring thereafter to the judgment of Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India (MBA (II))⁸³, pertaining to the constitutional validity of National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, the court discussed that since the entity was meant to replace High Courts in their entirety, therefore chairperson and members were held to be required to be appointed through a process similar to that for the High Court Judges. All aspects of appointment and tenure must remain free from executive interference and for this reason the provisions were declared unconstitutional.

Referring thereafter to the judgments of Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India (MBA (III))⁸⁴, and Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd.⁸⁵, wherein the constitutional validity of Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 (for short, “Tribunal Rules, 2017”) was under challenge, the court reiterated that if any delegated legislation made under the parent statute exceeds the limit of the parent statute or violates constitutional principles under which it is enacted, the rules can be struck down individually. The composition of Search-cum-Selection Committee (for short, “SCSC”) cannot be dominated by executive nominees with minimal judicial representation. Such provisions are clearly an attempt to keep the judiciary away from the process of selection and violative of doctrine of separation of powers (for short, “SOP”), undermining the independence of judiciary. When executive itself is a dominant player and party to litigation before tribunals, it cannot be permitted to play a leading role in appointing their members. Executive control must be excluded from the appointment process of bodies performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. For this reason, the provisions pertaining to Search-cum-Selection Committee under the Tribunal Rules, 2017 were held to have violated the constitutional scheme and accordingly struck down. The concurring opinion of Justices Chandrachud and Deepak Gupta endorsed the suggestion of constitution of independent statutory body titled as “National Tribunals Commission” for overseeing the selection process of members, criteria for appointment, salaries and allowances and other such features pertaining to establishment of Tribunals. The determination of qualifications is an essential legislative function, which cannot be delegated.

The Court then referred to and discussed the law laid down in the matter of Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India (MBA (IV))⁸⁶, wherein the Tribunal Rules of 2020 were challenged. The challenge was laid on very many grounds, viz. appointment of non-judicial persons to posts meant for Judicial Members, or appointment of Presiding Officers being contrary to the earlier judgments of the court. The court in MBA (IV) case approved the arrangement that Chairperson of the Tribunal would be a retired Supreme Court judge or Chief Justice of a High Court. Even though members from the executive may be part of the Search-cum-Selection Committee, however they shall not have any voting rights in the proceedings. The Rules of 2020 were found to be not in conformity with the law laid down in Rojer Mathew case and were struck down. This judgment again reiterated the suggestion of constitution of National Tribunals Commission as an independent body to supervise the appointments and functioning of Tribunals and the overall supervisory functions in relation to Tribunals. The court directed the Union of India to suitably amend the Rules of 2020, with broadly the following changes:

1. The casting vote in the Search-cum-Selection Committee should be with the Chief Justice of India or his nominee Chairperson;

2. Advocates with an experience of at least 10 years of practice shall be eligible for appointment as Judicial Members in the Tribunals;

3. Recommendations of Search-cum-Selection Committee in matters of disciplinary action shall be final, which recommendations will be implemented by the Central Government.

After the judgment of MBA (IV) case, Parliament enacted the Tribunal Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 (Ordinance of 2021), introducing amendments to the Finance Act, 2017. This led to Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India (MBA (V))⁸⁷ judgment, wherein the provisions of the said Ordinance of 2021 and that of Finance Act, 2017 were challenged.

Analysis of legal developments from MBA (I) to MBA (V)

The court referring to the judgment of MBA (IV) case reiterated that the directions were issued in the nature of mandamus after the Supreme Court found the various provisions of the Finance Act, 2017 as well as the Rules framed thereunder as violative of previous judgments, Article 14, the doctrine of SOP and independence of judiciary. Thus, a mandamus issued by the Supreme Court cannot be reversed by the legislature as it would amount to impermissible legislative overruling.

The Union of India contended that the court cannot direct the legislature to make the law in a particular manner and at the highest, the directions issued by the court can be treated only as suggestions. The aforesaid contention of Union of India was repelled by the Supreme Court earlier already holding that law does not permit the legislature to take back what has been already granted in the implementation of the court’s decision. Even interim orders passed by the Supreme Court cannot be overruled by a legislative act.

The concurring opinion of Justice Ravindra Bhat distinguished luminously judicial review concerning tribunals from judicial review of pure policy matters, because the former involves court’s active intervention in ensuring the independent and efficient functioning of tribunals. In matters which concern administration of justice through alternative adjudicatory forums, the court’s role as a watchdog becomes much greater and larger. This is because any new adjudicatory mechanism replaces the system of existing courts and has implications over “equal protection of law clause” available under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The concurring opinion also dealt with the issue of minimum age criterion of 50 years as eligibility for appointment to the Tribunal. It was held that such an age criteria results in filtering out candidates with more relevant experience and qualifications in preference to those with lesser relevant experience only on the ground of age. The criteria of minimum 50 years of age is virtually picked out from a hat and therefore an arbitrary cut-off was a view taken in the concurring opinion. The “status of tribunal members” can by no stretch of imagination be compared with that of civil servants, because tribunal members are not holders of civil posts or members of any cadre civil service. After all, as the conscience keepers of the Constitution of India, the courts intervene only to uphold the citizens” rights and ensure that adjudicatory bodies remain independent, competent and fair.

The Supreme Court therefore by referring to the MBA (IV) case judgment, reiterated that settled jurisprudence of larger Benches not only informs but compels the conclusions we reach. It provides the normative standards on which impugned enactment must be assessed and tested on standards laid down by earlier judgments.

Analysis of submissions of the parties by the court

The court then analysed the issue as to whether Parliament possesses the authority to disregard a judicial pronouncement by enacting a statute in any manner it deems appropriate. Referring to the judgment of Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, In re⁸⁸, the Supreme Court reiterated that sovereignty which can be claimed by Parliament in England cannot be claimed by any legislature in India because Indian constitutional framework is rooted in the principle of constitutional supremacy—“supremacy of the Constitution”. Referring further to the judgments of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala⁸⁹ and Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India⁹⁰, the Supreme Court reiterated that Constitution is the “suprema lex”, the paramount law of the land. Its inherent dynamism makes it organic and therefore the concept of constitutional sovereignty is sacrosanct. It does not allow the existence of absolute power in any institution which it has created and that judicial review as part of the basic structure and feature of the Constitution of India ensures that every institution acts within its bounds and limit. The power to assess whether law made by the legislature comports with the constitutional limitations is vested only with the courts, as “the Constitution is what the court says it is”. The court is the final arbiter of constitutional meaning and therefore once the court strikes down any provision or issues binding directions after identifying a constitutional defect, Parliament cannot simply overrule or contradict that judicial decision by re-enacting the very same measure in a different form. It cannot merely restate or repackage the invalidated provision in a new framework. Referring to the judgment of NHPC Ltd. v. State of H.P.⁹¹,the Supreme Court reiterated that wherever legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a previous legislation struck down already or rendered inoperative by a Constitutional Court, without curing the defects in such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra vires. Referring to the judgment of Jaya Thakur v. Union of India⁹², it reiterated that a writ of mandamus cannot be nullified by a subsequent legislation made by the legislature, since judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India. The inability to compel Parliament to legislate in a specific manner cannot translate into an obligation on the part of the judiciary to blindly accept any law whatever Parliament enacts. For this reason therefore there is a clear distinction between “directing legislation” and “reviewing legislation”. In the exercise of a latter nature, the judiciary can review a statute which perpetuates the very same defects the court has earlier struck down.

The court then dealt with another submission of the Union of India that legislations cannot be tested on the touchstone of abstract principles like SOP or judicial independence. Holding that the aforesaid argument has already been examined in depth and categorically repelled in the concurring opinion of Justice Ravindra Bhat in MBA (V) case.⁹³ In MBA (V) case, it was held that principles of SOP and judicial independence are not vague, free-floating ideals, but structural pillars of our constitutional order. Whenever Parliament designs or alters the Tribunal system, it is obligated to do it consistently with the constitutional requirements of independence, impartiality and effective adjudication. The benchmarks laid down by the court over the period of time whilst testing the validity of laws pertaining to tribunals constitute the operative test for evaluating the constitutional validity of such similar legislations. This is because they are in sync with the concept of “equal protection of laws” as postulated under Article 14. The benchmarks are structural principles providing the normative boundaries within which Parliament must legislate and cannot be treated as abstract or unenforceable. The norms laid down in the series of tribunal cases are normative standards and constitutional requirements distilled from Articles 323-A and B read with the doctrines of SOP, independence of the judiciary and guarantee of equal protection under Article 14. These doctrines furnish the constitutional tests which any and every legislation on tribunals must satisfy.

The court thereafter proceeded to analyse and compare the various provisions of the Ordinance of 2021 (struck down earlier in MBA (V) case) and the impugned Tribunals Act of 2021. After drawing a detailed comparison, the court found that wording, structure and legal effect of both the legislations remain the same barring a few differences. The impugned enactment therefore does not cure the law declared earlier, but consciously refines it. It miserably fails to remove the defects identified previously and therefore falls afoul of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court referred again to another quote of Dr B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly, which stated that Constitution can be perverted without changing its form, but by merely changing the form of administration. The impugned enactment was therefore found to have introduced a “form of administration”, inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution.

The court accordingly directed that unless the constitutional concerns repeatedly highlighted by the Supreme Court earlier in a series of tribunal related judgments are fully addressed and cured and faithfully given effect to by Parliament, the directions issued in the judgments of MBA (IV) case and MBA (V) case shall continue to govern all matters relating to appointment, qualifications and allied aspects concerning tribunal members and chairpersons. The court also reiterated the obligation of the executive to establish a National Tribunals Commission in accordance with the principles and framework articulated therein. However, the appointments which were made before the commencement of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 were all directed to be protected. The writ petitions were accordingly disposed of in the above terms.

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(17) SK. MD. Anisur Rahaman v. State of W.B.⁹⁴

(Delivered on 26-11-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih

Authored by: Justice Dipankar Datta

The miscellaneous applications were filed in a disposed of matter seeking modification of one of the conditions of bail, which required petitioner-accused to remain confined to the city of Kolkata after his release. The Supreme Court earlier in January 2025 granted bail to the petitioner-accused, in relation to offences registered under the provisions of the Penal Code and the Arms Act. The allegation against the petitioner was that he used his political and criminal might to eliminate his rival in furtherance of a conspiracy hatched with the other co-accused persons.

The Supreme Court earlier released the petitioner on bail, when the trial was being delayed inordinately. However various conditions including the aforesaid condition of his confinement to Kolkata was imposed accompanying the order on bail. Whilst applying for modification, the petitioner Anisur pleaded that such a condition is an unreasonable restriction on his right to liberty and resultantly violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

On the contrary, the objectors and the relatives of the victim opposing the bail modification application contended that accused Anisur would exploit his political influence to prevail upon the system and adversely influencing the trial. It was further contended that the State of West Bengal has shamelessly sought to shield and protect the interests of the petitioner accused.

Consideration and analysis by the court

The court underscored the developments during the pendency of the trial and the manner in which it progressed. The de facto complainant and almost 10 police witnesses turned hostile and the state even gave the direction for the withdrawal of prosecution. The Supreme Court had to intervene and restrain the State Government from withdrawing the sessions trial against the accused. The court further found that after one of the Judges presiding over the Bench which passed the order granting conditional bail to the petitioner had demitted office, immediately thereafter the bail modification application was moved. Criticizing this said conduct and approach adopted by the accused immediately preferring a modification application post the retirement of the Senior Judge presiding over the Bench. The Supreme Court observed that judicial orders determining issues between the parties to the list bind them and its conclusive nature ensures that justice is always served. Quoting Justice Robert Jackson — “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final”, the Supreme Court observed that succeeding Benches or specially constituted Benches at the behest of the aggrieved party should not topple verdicts that have been settled between the parties by a Judge who had demitted the seat of a Supreme Court Judge. A matter which becomes res integra ought not to be reopened or revisited casually, lest it sacrifices consistency and also works to the detriment of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Overturning a prior verdict by a later verdict by a different composition of Bench does not necessarily mean that justice is better served. A subsequent Bench of a different combination must always defer to the views expressed by the earlier Bench, unless there is something so grossly erroneous on the face of the record or palpably wrong that it necessitates a relook in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Referring to the judgment of Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra⁹⁵, the court observed that be it review petition or curative petition, the exercise of inherent jurisdiction by successor Benches must be rare.

Applying the aforesaid principles in the case at hand, the court held that stringent conditions imposed by the Bench while granting bail, there had been no significant change in circumstances warranting a reconsideration. The petitioner had been patronised actively by the State police force of West Bengal and the fact that he was provided security cover by the State police itself speaks volumes about the conduct of the State. The Supreme Court accordingly directed the Sessions Court to expedite the trial.

The court further found that the Presiding Judge of the Sessions Court where the trial was pending had recorded disparaging and adverse remarks against the Additional Public Prosecutor for pleading for time for recalling and production of additional witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the Sessions Court ought to have been alive to the situation that the current initiative of the Public Prosecutor was necessary for a fair, effective and meaningful trial, more so when he had been appointed on the orders of the court. In the context of too many legal maxims employed by the Presiding Officer whilst passing the order disparaging the Special Public Prosecutor (for short, “SPP”), the court observed that reference to legal maxims could be insightful if the context so requires, but overusing them might distract from the main issue coming across as ostentatious rather than substantive. The Special Public Prosecutor was therefore held to have been unfairly criticized by the Sessions Court without realising the seriousness and magnitude of the situation and the purpose for which such an application was moved by the Special Public Prosecutor before the Sessions Court.

Accordingly, the application for modification of the bail condition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

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(18) Rajasthan High Court v. Rajat Yadav⁹⁶

(Delivered on 19-12-2025)

Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih

Authored by: Justice Dipankar Datta

The appeals were preferred against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, which accepted the contentions of various candidates participating in the selection process and directed for the revision of category-wise lists by properly applying the reservation to the various posts.

Factual matrix and the High Court judgment under challenge

The High Court issued an advertisement in August 2022, inviting applications for appointment to various ministerial posts in the High Court and the allied institutions. These vacancies were distributed category-wise across General, SC, ST, OBC and other reserved categories. The scheme of selection envisaged a written test of 100 marks, followed by a typewriting test on a computer of 100 marks with varying percentages as qualifying marks depending on the reservation. The challenge emanated when the first phase of the examination of the written test was convened and the list of candidates who qualified for the second stage of the examination, i.e. type writing test was duly published. In this list it so happened that whilst preparing the said list, candidates who had secured in excess of the cut-off marks for the general category, but less than the cut-off marks of their respective reserve category were placed in the reserved post compartment only. They were not extended the advantage of being placed against the “general posts”. Thus writ petitions were preferred essentially to quash the result of May 2023 including the cut-off being contrary to the constitutional method of implementation of reservation and for directing that reserve category candidates who secured marks greater or equivalent to the general category cut-off be included in the “general category list” and not in the “reserved category list”. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that the recruiter’s contention of exclusion of reserve category candidates from the reserve category was liable to be rejected as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It held that reservation may involve preferring a less meritorious candidate, however it cannot imply that a more meritorious reserve category candidate stands confined to his own slot. The general/open category compartment could not have been treated as reserved exclusively for general candidates, but was meant for anybody (even from the reserved classes) who could secure cut-off marks for being placed in the said category.

Being so aggrieved, the Registrar General, High Court preferred appeals before the Supreme Court.

Observations, analysis and findings of the court

There was also a preliminary objection regarding the principle of estoppel being applicable to the writ petitioners, who were estopped from challenging the recruitment process, having once participated in it. Relying upon the judgments of Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar⁹⁷ and Raj Kumar v. Shakti Raj⁹⁸, the Supreme Court reiterated that mere participation of a candidate in any selection process does not imply acceptance of any illegality in the conduct of the said procedure or constitutional infirmity underlying it. Wherever the challenge pertains to misconstruction of statutory Rules or violation of constitutional principles, the plea of estoppel cannot operate as a bar. This is premised on the rationale that despite due diligence, the candidate could not have known earlier the illegalities in the recruitment procedure that came to be adopted or that the procedural flaw striking at the root of the selection process was latent and surfaced only after completion of the process of selection. In the present case, the said judgments were clearly applicable since the writ petitioners would have never possibly visualised the wrong implementation of reservation principles in the overall recruitment process. Thus, the Division Bench was held to have rightly exercised its jurisdiction.

On contentions relating to double benefit available to reserved category candidates and the precedents on migration

It was contended on behalf of the appellants before the Supreme Court that reserve category candidates had a double benefit in the recruitment process, viz. one at the initial stage/screening process of the selection process and thereafter in the final stage and subsequent stage of the recruitment process. The Supreme Court repealing the said contention observed that a candidate belonging to reserved category may on his own merit secure marks in the preliminary stage as well as the final stage. It cannot be contended that he’s getting a double benefit as there is no constitutional power for a reserved category candidate from being considered on merit against the unreserved category. Likewise, the plea of migration as a ground of opposition to the writ petitioners was also repelled. The Court held that a reserved category candidate who secures marks more than the open category candidates is entitled to choose the particular service/cadre/post as per his choice/preference and cannot be compelled to accept appointment to an inferior post leaving the more important service/cadre/post in the reserved category for less meritorious candidates of that category.

Relying upon the judgment of Jitendra Kumar Singh v. State of U.P.⁹⁹, the court held that concessions granted at the threshold stage like reduced fee, age relaxation to reserve category candidates for enabling them to participate in the selection process cannot be equated with relaxations in the standards of selection. The standards of selection are always based on the individual merit of the candidate in the selection process, viz. the written test and the interview. Such concessions at the threshold do not disturb the level playing field. Referring further to the judgments of Deepa E.V. v. Union of India¹⁰⁰, the court held that till and until the statutory rules place a specific embargo, reserve category candidates having availed any relaxation or concession cannot be denied the advantage of opting for an unreserved post in case they are entitled to opt for them on the basis of their individual merit.

The court then explained the “concept of migration” and examined whether the concept applies in the instant case of reserve category candidates occupying the positions and posts meant for general category candidates. Elaborating upon the expression “equality before law” as ingrained under Article 14, the court held that the said provision is aimed at securing the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the society and to protect them from social injustice, exclusion and exploitation. It is not referable to any formal legal equality, but an assessment of real-world consequences flowing from the principle of equality.

Referring to the judgments of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India¹⁰¹ and Saurav Yadav v. State of U.P.¹⁰², the court held that the “concept of migration” from the reserved to the unreserved category is possible but always based on meritorious performance. In the case of migration from reserved to open category, the vacancy in the reserve category must be filled by another person from the same specified category lower in rank. However, the court added that the open/unreserved/general category should not be presumed to be reserved for any caste, tribe, class or gender, but means that it is open to all notwithstanding that a certain class also competes for appointment on vacant posts reserved for constitutional reservations. In the case of constitutional reservations, the concept of migration cannot imply that if a reserved category candidate competes for an unreserved category, he forfeits his right to make any claim against the reserved category. If in the first stage, the candidate finds a place on the basis of his merit in the general category, he is not precluded from taking advantage of the reservation and opting for the reserved post at the final stage of selection. Merely because in the first stage of selection he found a place in the general category will not imply that in the subsequent stage of selection he cannot opt for picking up the post reserved for him in the reserved compartment. This is however subject entirely to the recruitment rules.

In the case at hand, the court observed that none of the writ petitioner candidates were found to have taken advantage of any concession/relaxation and if they outshined the general category candidates, then the question of their migration or deriving twin benefits of migration did not and cannot arise. Accepting the proposition advanced by the appellants would have a serious detrimental impact on candidates from the disadvantageous sections and also eroding the constitutional principles. The claim of reserved category candidates to be accommodated in the open category on the basis of marks should be determined at the final stage and not earlier.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court and dismissed the appeals preferred before it.

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(19) Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v. Vanashakti¹⁰³

(Delivered on 18-11-2025)

Coram: three-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ and Ujjal Bhuyan and K. Vinod Chandran

Authored by: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai

The judgment came to be delivered in a review petition, wherein the petitioner sought recall of the judgment delivered earlier by the Supreme Court in Vanashakti v. Union of India¹⁰⁴. Along with the petitioner, there were certain other review petitions, viz. those filed by the Union of India and other entities. In the judgment under review (for short, “JUR”), the Supreme Court earlier directed that there cannot be retrospective grant of environmental clearance to any entity and the various office memorandums (OMs) and notifications issued from time to time were all illegal and accordingly struck down. The Central Government was restrained from issuing any circulars/orders/OMs/notifications providing for grant of ex post facto environmental clearance in any form or manner for regularising the acts done in contravention of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) notifications issued from time to time.

In a way therefore, the court held that projects which had commenced without grant of prior environmental clearance (for short, “prior EC”) could not be saved later by grant of ex post facto clearances.

Factual matrix of the case

In exercise of powers conferred under Sections 3(2)(v) and 5(3)(d), Environment Protection Act, 1986 (for short, “EP Act”) and the Environment Protection Rules (for short, “EP Rules”), the Ministry of Environment, Forest (MoEF) issued a notification on 14 September 2006, titled as EIA Notification, whereunder on the basis of categorisation of various projects, procurement of prior environmental clearance was mandated. The 2017 Notification thereafter permitted grant of ex post facto environmental clearance with respect to projects which did not have the prior environmental clearance.

However, cases of violation would be appraised by respective committees constituted by the Union of India, which would examine whether under the prevailing laws the project is permissible and the expansion which has been done (without obtaining prior environmental clearance) can be done sustainably under compliance of environmental norms with adequate environmental safeguards. A window of 6 months was also provided from the date of notification to all such projects which had started in contravention of the EIA notifications to make such an application.

The National Green Tribunal (NGT) New Delhi through its judgment delivered in Tanaji Balasaheb Gambhire v. State of Maharashtra¹⁰⁵, and directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) to prepare a proper standard operating procedure (for short, “SOP”) for grant of environmental clearance in cases of violation of environmental norms. Accordingly, a new OM dated 7 July 2021 came to be issued prescribing the standard operating procedure for identification and handling of violation cases under the 2006 Notification. It is in this backdrop that writ petitions were filed challenging the 2017 Notification as well as the OM of 2021, questioning the process of grant of ex post facto environmental clearances to the errant projects. Vide the judgment under review, it was held that if the project is under construction, the same has to be stopped and demolished; even if the operation has already commenced, the same has to cease to be operational. The Notification of 2017 and the 2021 OM were both held to be bad in law being contrary to the provisions of the EP Act as well as the EP Rules and therefore were struck down.

It is this judgment under review which fell for review before the Supreme Court.

Discussion and analysis

Referring to Section 3(2)(v), the court held that the Central Government is empowered to issue notifications on the aspect of regulating environmental compliances by various operations and activities. The 2017 Notification was also issued exercising this power, which had referred to earlier OMs of December 2012 and June 2013 of similar nature, in cases of violation of environmental norms. The 2021 OM subjected cases of violation to — 1) damage assessment; 2) remedial plan; and 3) community augmentation plan by the committees, as the case may be. Thus, what the 2017 Notification and the 2021 OM did was to have regulated the cases of violation, by modifying them in a manner that they become environmentally sustainable and compatible. If such a modification of the project was not possible, the project was liable to be demolished or closed.

The court then answered the core issue as to whether such a notification could have ever been issued or not and whether issuance of such a notification was in the teeth of earlier judgments of the Supreme Court. Referring to the judgment of Common Cause v. Union of India¹⁰⁶, the court held that environmental clearance is granted only after due diligence and reasonable care adopted by the competent authorities. Grant of environmental clearance comes into force only on the date of its grant and not earlier. Even in Common Cause case, which related to illegal commencement of mining quarries and leases, they were permitted to restart mining operations after making statutory compliances and paying all the outstanding dues. Thus, complete closure of the mining activity was never resorted to in the judgment of Common Cause case

Likewise, in the judgment of Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati¹⁰⁷, after undertaking the analysis of impermissibility of grant of ex post facto environmental clearance, the Supreme Court permitted the concerned industries instead of directing their absolute closure. The Supreme Court took a view that revocation of the environmental clearances (only because they were granted at a later point of time) and consequent closure of the unit does not accord with the principles of proportionality. Though the breach by industries cannot be left unattended to, however a balanced approach must be adopted by directing them to account for having operated without environmental clearances by imposing suitable penalties. The Supreme Court held that the operative paragraphs of Alembic Pharmaceuticals case were perhaps never brought to the notice of the court whilst passing the judgment under review. Referring thereafter to the judgment of Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India¹⁰⁸, the Supreme Court observed that the judgment under review overlooked certain passages even in this judgment, having a vital bearing on its outcome. The court sounded a note of caution against closing down a large number of industries which may affect the livelihood of hundreds of employees and resultantly the economy as well if such projects can comply with environmental norms. It reiterated that ex post facto clearances/approvals/permissions cannot be declined on the ground of technical irregularities with pedantic rigidity, oblivious of the consequences of stopping the operation of any major industry. Vide para 75, the Supreme Court in Electrosteel Steels case categorically held that the EP Act does not prohibit ex post facto environmental clearances.

Referring thereafter to the judgment of Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board¹⁰⁹, the court held that the judgment under review was passed in ignorance of the aforesaid judgment where specifically the validity of the 2017 Notification was under challenge. Referring to Section 21, General Clauses Act, 1897, the Supreme Court in the Swamy case took a specific stand that a valid statutory notification issued by the Union of India in exercise of statutory powers in the same manner as the earlier EIA Notifications of 1994 and 2006 cannot be held to be bad. The Union of India possesses undoubtedly the power to rescind, modify or amend the notifications issued in the like manner earlier and therefore no fault can be found with the validly issued notification of 2017. The standard operating procedure formulated vide the 2021 OM also gives effect to various judicial pronouncements including Alembic Pharmaceuticals case and Electrosteel Steels case. The 2021 OM was considered and duly approved by the Supreme Court earlier in the judgment of Swamy case. The Supreme Court eventually held that therefore the judgment under review was passed overlooking the observations made in the earlier judgments and in ignorance of the various precedents which had already settled the issue.

The court then undertook discussion about judicial discipline and judicial propriety and how judgment under review breached both. Referring to the judgments of Official Liquidator v. Dayanand¹¹⁰, Shah Faesal v. Union of India¹¹¹ and Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi¹¹², the Supreme Court reiterated that a Bench of two Judges cannot take a view contrary to that taken by a Bench of co-equal strength. A judgment delivered by a subsequent Bench of the same strength in ignorance of the earlier judgment of the Bench of co-equal strength is per incuriam in law. A decision or a judgment becomes per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment by a Bench of same strength. Per incuriam is a Latin term which means “by inadvertence or lack of care”. When Article 141 states that Supreme Court’s decisions are binding on all the courts within the Territory of India, it does not extend to binding the Supreme Court itself, which remains free to reconsider its judgment in appropriate cases, however by a Bench of larger strength. If any judgment fails to notice a specific statutory bar or an earlier binding precedent, then it cannot carry any binding value, when the reasoning adopted and result reached by the court runs counter to the earlier view. The doctrine of per incuriam applies strictly to the ratio decidendi and does not apply to obiter dicta.

Applying the aforesaid principles whilst testing the judgment under review in the review petitions, the Supreme Court observed that the concept of ex post facto or retrospective environmental clearance cannot be treated to be completely alien to environmental jurisprudence. Otherwise in the long line of judgments, the Supreme Court would not have permitted the operations and activities to have continued when admittedly they were commenced without the grant of prior environmental clearance. The earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in the Swamy case was never brought to its notice when judgment under review came to be passed. For this reason, therefore, judgment under review becomes per incuriam to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the Swamy case and Pahwa Plastics (P) Ltd. v. Dastak NGO¹¹³.

Referring to Section 15 EP Act, the court observed that even the said provision was incorrectly interpreted by the judgment under review, since it is only about imposition of penalty. When admittedly some of the projects are relating to public welfare activities, concerning the construction of hospitals/medical colleges/airports, or relating to common effluent treatment plants, then if the judgment under review is not recalled, it will result in not only stalling, but demolition of various buildings/projects constructed out of the public exchequer to the tune of nearly Rs 20,000 crores. This includes All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) Medical College, Greenfield Airport to be constructed in Vijaynagar in the State of Karnataka and many other such projects. The court however clarified that even if ex post facto environmental clearance is to be permitted, it can be granted only in respect of projects which are otherwise permissible in law and not those projects which are not permissible under law. The modus operandi of demolishing the project having commenced without prior environmental clearance and then its reconstruction after applying for environmental clearance afresh, after procuring the environmental clearance would not be in the larger public interest, rather counter-productive to it. Even if at a later stage project proponents are permitted to construct the project again after razing it down, the loss eventually would be of the public exchequer only. Razing down the project and thereafter starting it afresh would not suit anybody’s interest.

Referring to the two judgments of Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj Babulal Kotecha¹¹⁴ and Bindu Kapurea v. Subhashish Panda¹¹⁵, the court observed that where any outcome would create a paradox when “environmental restoration” results in greater ecological harm than the original transformation, the court must sufficiently balance the equities. Avoiding a situation of counter-productive remedial intervention, the Supreme Court reiterated that in cases where “die is cast” and what’s done cannot be undone, then demolishing, dismantling or destroying everything by squandering significant public resources is not justified.

Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion, the judgment under review was thus recalled by the Supreme Court and writ petitions along with the appeal were restored to the file by allowing the review petition.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan dissented from the majority decision allowing the review petition filed by the Confederation of Real Estate Developers’ Associations of India (CREDAI) and recalling the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Vanashakti case. In his view, the review petition disclosed no legally sustainable ground for interference with the earlier judgment and ought to have been dismissed. The review was primarily founded on two grounds: Firstly, that the earlier Vanashakti judgment¹¹⁶ had failed to consider or correctly apply certain decisions particularly the decisions given in the judgments of Common Cause v. Union of India¹¹⁷, Alembic Pharmaceuticals case¹¹⁸, Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India¹¹⁹, Pahwa Plastics case¹²⁰ and Swamy case¹²¹; and secondly, that implementation of Vanashakti case could cause substantial economic loss and additional environmental pollution because projects might have to be demolished. Justice Bhuyan, rejecting both the grounds also pointed out that although the MoEFCC was the authority that had issued the 2017 Notification and the 2021 OM, it had itself not sought review of Vanashakti case and had accepted the judgment.

Justice Bhuyan then traced the development of India’s environmental regulatory framework to demonstrate why prior environmental clearance is fundamental. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 empowered the Central Government to take measures for protecting and improving environmental quality, while the 1994 EIA Notification required specified projects to obtain environmental clearance before commencing activities. The subsequent 2006 EIA Notification expressly made prior environmental clearance mandatory for new projects as well as specified expansion or modernisation. According to Justice Bhuyan, the environmental jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court has firmly incorporated the precautionary principle, polluter pays principle, sustainable development and inter-generational equity, with environmental protection also forming part of the Constitutional guarantee under Article 21 and the fundamental duty under Article 51-A(g). He particularly relied upon Common Cause case, where the court held that environmental clearance could not be treated as a mere formality and that retrospective or ex post facto clearance was contrary to the environmental regulatory framework. The fact that relief had been granted to certain mining operators in the peculiar circumstances of that case did not, according to him, constitute the ratio decidendi permitting retrospective environmental clearances generally.

The dissent of Justice Bhuyan placed particular reliance on Alembic Pharmaceuticals case, which reaffirmed that ex post facto environmental clearance was inconsistent with fundamental environmental principles. Justice Bhuyan explained that the purpose of prior environmental clearance is preventive before an environmentally significant activity begins, the authority must undertake processes such as screening, scoping, appraisal and public participation so that potential environmental consequences can be assessed in advance. Permitting clearance after an activity has already commenced would effectively allow an operator to function without the safeguard that environmental clearance is designed to impose and could result in irreversible environmental harm. Although the court in Alembic Pharmaceuticals case had permitted the industries concerned to continue operation upon payment of compensation, Justice Bhuyan stressed that this relief was granted under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in a particular fact of that case and could not be treated as a legal principle authorising ex post facto environmental clearances. Thus, for him, Common Cause case and Alembic Pharmaceuticals case established the governing principle that retrospective environmental clearance has no place in the ordinary scheme of environmental law. Justice Bhuyan next examined the subsequent decisions in Electrosteel Steels case, Pahwa Plastics case and Swami case. He acknowledged that these judgments adopted a more flexible approach holding that although ex post facto environmental clearance should not ordinarily be granted, the EP Act did not impose an absolute prohibition and exceptional cases could warrant consideration of such clearance, particularly where closure of an operating establishment could have serious economic and employment consequences. However, Justice Bhuyan held that this trilogy of decisions could not displace the earlier binding principles in Common Cause case and Alembic Pharmaceuticals case. He invoked the doctrine of per incuriam, explaining that a decision rendered in ignorance of a binding statute or precedent does not possess binding precedential value. In his view, Electrosteel Steel case, Pahwa Plastics case, and Swami case had departed from the ratio of earlier coordinate Bench decisions without properly reconciling them. He further observed that Swami case had declared the validity of the 2017 notification and 2021 OM even though their legality was not actually the issue requiring adjudication in that case. Consequently, he considered those later decisions to be per incuriam and held that Vanashakti Bench was justified in following Common Cause case and Alembic Pharmaceuticals case instead.

A further important part of the dissent concerned the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM, wherein Justice Bhuyan held that the 2017 Notification created a limited opportunity for projects already in violation of 2006 EIA Notification to seek environmental clearance, but only within 6 months from 14 March 2017, with a further extension up to 13 April 2018 following proceedings before the Madras High Court. The Central Government had also assured the Madras High Court that the 2017 measure was intended to operate only once. According to Justice Bhuyan once that window expired, the 2021 OM could not legitimately create a fresh mechanism for projects that had subsequently commenced or continued without the required environmental clearance. He therefore regarded the 2021 OM as contrary to the statutory scheme and lacking legal validity. He also rejected CREDAI’s argument that demolition of projects would itself generate additional pollution and cause economic loss. In his view, parties who had undertaken activities without the legally required clearance could not rely upon the consequences of their own non-compliance and illegality. At the same time, he considered that genuine individual difficulties could be addressed through appropriate clarification and modification of the earlier Vanashakti’s direction without recalling the entire judgment.

Finally, Justice Bhuyan placed his dissent within the broader principle of non-regression in environmental protection. Referring to the Rio Conferences, the Paris Agreement and Indian constitutional jurisprudence, he reasoned that sustainable development requires environmental safeguards to progress rather than retreat. The doctrine of non-regression prevents the state from rolling back existing levels of environmental protection. He rejected the suggestion that environmental protection and economic development are inherently opposed, observing that both must operate within the constitutional framework of sustainable development. In his concluding assessment, he stated permitting retrospective environmental clearance would weaken the preventive character of the environmental regulation and undermine the precautionary principle. He emphasised that Supreme Court as the highest Constitutional Court has the obligation to protect the environment and should not retreat from the environmental principles developed through decades of judicial decisions. The review petition did not establish a proper ground for review and the concerns raised by individual applicants could not be addressed without recalling Vanashakti, Justice Bhuyan dismissed the review petition.