When a civil court passes a money decree, the decree-holder may apply for execution against the judgment debtor’s property, and in narrow circumstances against the judgment debtor personally. Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, lists the property that can be attached and sold in execution, and its proviso then removes twenty categories from that list. Order 21 Rules 37 to 40, read with the proviso to Section 51, govern the separate question of when a judgment debtor can be arrested and detained in civil prison.
The exemptions exist because a money decree is meant to be satisfied out of what a judgment debtor can spare, and not out of the things that keep a household running and a trade going. The proviso protects cooking vessels and bedding, an artisan’s tools, an agriculturist’s implements and cattle, the larger part of a salary, provident fund and pension money, and several rights that cannot sensibly be sold at all. Section 60(1A) makes void any agreement by which a person waives one of these exemptions. The protection therefore cannot be signed away in advance, and it holds whether or not the judgment debtor knew about the exemption when the document was signed.
Those exemptions operate against a starting position that is deliberately wide. Section 60(1) makes liable to attachment and sale “all other saleable property, movable or immovable, belonging to the judgment-debtor, or over which, or the profits of which, he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit”, and it reaches that property even where another person holds it in trust for the debtor.
Against that reach, the twenty exempt heads do more work than their placement inside a proviso suggests. The Explanation to Section 51 directs that in calculating a judgment debtor’s means, any property exempt from attachment is left out of account, so the same list that keeps a pension out of the decree-holder’s hands also removes it from the arithmetic that decides whether the debtor goes to civil prison. An executing court that attaches an unidentified head of retirement benefit has therefore made two errors at once, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court set aside an order of exactly that kind in 2026 because the court below had never specified which benefit it was attaching.
The arrest half of the Code has been read the same way recently. In a 2025 ruling in Nizam Sheikh v. Alimuddin, the Delhi High Court held that arrest and detention in civil prison are not an automatic consequence of non-payment, and that an executing court must comply with the proviso to Section 51 read with Order 21 Rules 37 and 40 before ordering either. The Court added that a judgment debtor’s physical fitness or capacity to earn does not by itself establish present means to pay. Both halves of the topic run on that same enquiry into what the judgment debtor actually has, and both operate at the stage of execution of a decree.
The two limbs are easiest to see working on one set of facts. A clerk in a private company owes ₹4,20,000 under a money decree. The decree-holder applies for execution, asks for attachment of the salary, and asks in the same application for the clerk’s arrest. The executing court issues a notice under Order 21 Rule 37 calling on the clerk to show cause why he should not be committed to the civil prison.
That salary comes to ₹36,000 a month, and clause (i) of the proviso to Section 60(1) divides it. The first ₹1,000 and two-thirds of the remainder are exempt, so ₹24,333 is protected and ₹11,667 can be attached. The flat the clerk lives in is not protected at all, because clause (c) covers a house belonging to an agriculturist, a labourer or a domestic servant and occupied by that person, and a clerk in a private company is none of the three.
Two difficulties then appear on the record. The first is that the ₹24,333 protected by clause (i) also drops out of the means calculation under the Explanation to Section 51, so the decree-holder cannot point to the whole salary as proof of an ability to pay. The second is that no arrest may take place until the decree-holder has paid subsistence money into court under Order 21 Rule 39(1). On these facts the attachment of ₹11,667 a month stands, the flat may be sold, and the arrest application fails at the Rule 40 inquiry.
Property liable to attachment under Section 60 against the twenty exempt heads
Section 60(1) makes nearly everything a judgment debtor owns liable to attachment and sale, and its proviso then withdraws twenty lettered heads from that reach. The sub-section names lands, houses and other buildings, goods, money, bank-notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundis, promissory notes, Government securities, bonds, debts and shares in a corporation. It then adds a sweep-up limb catching “all other saleable property, movable or immovable”. The list at the front is illustrative; the sweep-up limb is what an executing court actually works with.
That sweep-up limb carries its own test. Property is attachable where it belongs to the judgment debtor, or where the debtor has “a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit” over the property or its profits. The second branch reaches assets the judgment debtor does not own outright but can deal with as though the ownership were his. The sub-section closes the obvious escape route by applying “whether the same be held in the name of the judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf”.
The exempt heads are commonly miscounted, and the error is easy to trace. The letters run from (a) to (p), which is sixteen, and revision notes routinely report the proviso as a sixteen-clause list. Four further heads were inserted without disturbing that lettering: clause (ia) by Act 66 of 1956, and clauses (ka), (kb) and (kc) by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Counting heads rather than letters gives twenty.
A single idea runs through all twenty. Each head protects either something the judgment debtor needs in order to go on living and earning, or something that is not usable property in the first place. The policy is subsistence: a money decree is satisfied out of what a debtor can spare, and not out of the tools and the roof that produce the next instalment. Section 60(1A) then puts that policy beyond the reach of the parties, because an agreement to waive any exemption under the section is void.
The twenty heads exempt from attachment, grouped into five families
The twenty heads fall into five families, grouped by what each head protects rather than by the order in which the amendments reached the section. The earlier iPleaders explainer on Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 sets out the same list in the statutory sequence.
| Family | Heads | What the family protects |
|---|---|---|
| Tools of a livelihood | (a), (b), (c) | wearing apparel, cooking vessels, beds and bedding, religious ornaments a woman cannot part with, an artisan’s tools, an agriculturist’s implements, cattle and seed-grain, and the house of an agriculturist, labourer or domestic servant |
| Things that are not usable property | (d), (e), (f), (m), (n) | books of account, a mere right to sue for damages, a right of personal service, an expectancy of succession by survivorship or other contingent interest, and a right to future maintenance |
| Earnings and retirement money | (g), (h), (i), (ia), (j), (k), (ka), (kb), (l) | pensions and gratuities, wages of labourers and domestic servants, the protected portion of salary, service pay and allowances, provident fund money, public provident fund money, life insurance money, and notified allowances |
| Statutory declarations | (o), (p) | any allowance declared exempt by an Indian law, and movable property exempt from sale for arrears of land revenue |
| Rent-controlled tenancy | (kc) | the interest of a lessee of a residential building governed by rent control law |
Two of the families carry a qualification on the face of the clause itself. Clause (b) exempts an agriculturist’s implements and only such cattle and seed-grain “as may, in the opinion of the Court, be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as such”, so the executing court fixes the quantum rather than the debtor. Clause (c) protects a house only where it belongs to an agriculturist, a labourer or a domestic servant and is occupied by that person, which leaves a salaried debtor’s house fully attachable.
Who counts as an agriculturist is defined rather than assumed. Explanation V requires a person who cultivates land personally and depends for a livelihood mainly on income from agricultural land, whether as owner, tenant, partner or agricultural labourer. Explanation VI treats cultivation as personal where it is done by the debtor’s own labour, by the labour of a family member, or by servants or labourers paid in cash or in kind, provided they are not paid a share of the produce. A landlord who takes a share of the crop and does no cultivating falls outside clauses (b) and (c) altogether.
Salary and pension exempt from attachment against the same money after it is paid
The earnings clauses protect money while it is still with the person who has to pay it, and most of that protection ends once the money reaches the judgment debtor. Clauses (g) to (l) of the proviso cover pensions, gratuities, wages, salary, service pay and provident fund money. Explanation I then extends the protection in time, and the case law cuts it off at a point the Explanation does not mention.
Explanation I is the timing rule. It provides that the moneys in clauses (g), (h), (i), (ia), (j), (l) and (o) are exempt from attachment or sale “whether before or after they are actually payable”, so a decree-holder cannot reach a pension at source by catching it before it falls due. The same Explanation states the opposite for the attachable slice of a salary, which is liable to attachment whether or not it is actually payable.
Clause (n) is not in that list. A right to future maintenance is exempt under clause (n) of the proviso itself, and notes that read Explanation I as covering clause (n) are adding a head the Explanation does not carry. The distinction bites where a maintenance decree is under execution, because clause (ia) then limits the attachment to one-third of the salary.
The arithmetic of clause (i) and clause (ia) for a salaried judgment debtor
Clause (i) protects the first one thousand rupees of salary and two-thirds of whatever remains, in execution of any decree other than a decree for maintenance. Clause (ia) reverses the shape for maintenance decrees and exempts one-third of the salary. Neither figure is a percentage of the whole salary, which is where the calculation usually goes wrong.
| Monthly salary | Exempt under clause (i) | Attachable |
|---|---|---|
| ₹18,000 | ₹1,000 plus ₹11,333, that is ₹12,333 | ₹5,667 |
| ₹36,000 | ₹1,000 plus ₹23,333, that is ₹24,333 | ₹11,667 |
| ₹75,000 | ₹1,000 plus ₹49,333, that is ₹50,333 | ₹24,667 |
The exempt portion therefore rises with the salary and never settles into a fixed proportion of it. What counts as salary is defined in Explanation II as the total monthly emoluments derived from employment, whether the person is on duty or on leave, excluding any allowance declared exempt under clause (l). An allowance notified as exempt is taken out before the clause (i) fraction is applied, and not after it.
Clause (i) carries a proviso limiting how long the attachable portion may be held. Where that portion has been under attachment, continuously or intermittently, for a total of twenty-four months, it becomes exempt for a further twelve months. Where the attachment ran in execution of one and the same decree, the portion is finally exempt from attachment in execution of that decree once the twenty-four months are complete. A decree-holder who has taken two years of a salary cannot return to the same salary on the same decree.
Clause (ia) takes a different route where the decree is for maintenance, and it is deliberately wider. Clause (ia) exempts one-third of the salary, which leaves two-thirds available, against the much smaller slice a decree-holder reaches on an ordinary money decree. On a salary of ₹36,000 a maintenance decree-holder can attach ₹24,000, where an ordinary decree-holder is confined to ₹11,667.
That gap is the reason the nature of the decree is settled before the fraction is chosen. A decree that mixes maintenance arrears with costs is executed for each component on its own footing, and treating the whole as a maintenance decree hands the decree-holder roughly twice the salary the Code allows.
The point at which the exemption from attachment stops
Protection under clauses (g), (k) and (ka) attaches to the character of the money rather than to the person holding it. In Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance, the Supreme Court held that provident fund sums, compulsory deposits and pensionary benefits keep that character, and stay unattachable, until they reach the hands of the employee. Once received, they cease to retain it and become attachable like any other money.
Once the money has actually been received, the authorities pull in two directions, and the split is worth carrying into an answer. In Radhey Shyam Gupta v. Punjab National Bank the Supreme Court set aside a direction that part of a decree be satisfied out of fixed deposits a guarantor had made from his pension and gratuity, holding that the High Court had committed a jurisdictional error having regard to proviso (g) to Section 60(1). On that view retiral money keeps its protected character even after it has been paid out and reinvested.
The competing line treats receipt as the end of the protection. In 2026 the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh held in Chuni Lal v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd that a pension credited to the pensioner’s own bank account had been paid to him and could be attached for his liability as a guarantor. Chuni Lal was decided under Section 11 of the Pensions Act, 1871 rather than under Section 60, so the governing provisions differ even though the fact patterns are close. An executing court faced with retiral money already sitting in a debtor’s account is therefore choosing between two reasoned positions rather than applying a settled rule.
The consequence for an executing court is that the head of payment has to be identified before anything is attached. In Mekathoti Yesupadam v. Tamada Ratna Kumari, decided in March 2026, the Andhra Pradesh High Court set aside an attachment of retirement benefits because the court below had never specified which benefit it was attaching and had proceeded on assumptions rather than on established facts. Gratuity, provident fund contributions, leave salary and life insurance proceeds each sit under a different head of the proviso, and an order that does not name the head cannot show that the money it seizes falls outside the exemption.
Waiver of exemption from attachment under Section 60(1A) CPC
Section 60(1A) makes an agreement to waive the benefit of any exemption under Section 60 void, so the protection does not depend on the judgment debtor knowing about it or asking for it. The sub-section was inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and operates “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”.
The numbering is worth fixing in memory, because two versions circulate. The anti-waiver rule is Section 60(1A). There is no Section 60(3), and an answer that cites one is citing a provision the Code does not contain. Section 60(2) carries the rent exception instead.
A waiver clause in a loan or guarantee document is therefore ineffective for this purpose. Lenders sometimes take a covenant by which the borrower agrees that a salary or provident fund balance may be attached in execution, and Section 60(1A) empties that covenant of effect. The decree-holder is left with whatever the proviso allows and nothing beyond it.
The exemption also operates whether or not it is pleaded. Because the proviso says the listed particulars “shall not be liable to such attachment or sale”, an executing court has no power to attach an exempt head even where the judgment debtor never appears. A debtor who fails to object has not lost the protection, although an application under Section 47 is usually needed to have the attachment raised once it has been ordered.
What the proviso gives is protection against attachment and sale, not against the decree. Exempt property stays exempt while the decree stands, and the decree continues to run against everything the proviso does not cover. Section 61 adds a partial exemption of the same kind for agricultural produce, under which the State Government may fix the portion needed for the next crop and for the debtor’s support until that crop is harvested. The general position on attachment of property under the Code proceeds on the same footing.
The rent-decree exception to the exemption in Section 60(2)
Section 60(2) removes the clause (c) protection in one situation only. Where the decree is for rent of the very house, building, site or land in question, that property is not exempt from attachment or sale, even though the judgment debtor is an agriculturist, a labourer or a domestic servant occupying it. The exception is tied to the property, so a rent decree relating to one house does not open up another house the debtor occupies.
The drafting choice answers a problem clause (c) would otherwise create. A tenant who is a labourer would be unable to pay rent and unable to have the house sold, and the obligation would become unenforceable against the very asset it relates to. Section 60(2) is written narrowly for that reason, and it does not extend to an ordinary money decree that happens to be against the same occupant.
Clause (kc) protects the other side of the same relationship. The interest of a lessee of a residential building governed by rent control law is exempt from attachment and sale, so a decree-holder cannot bring a protected tenancy to auction and put a stranger into the debtor’s home. The exemption covers the leasehold interest itself rather than the tenant’s goods inside the building, which remain attachable unless another head of the proviso reaches them.
Section 61 works the same way for a crop rather than a building. The State Government may declare, by order published in the Official Gazette, that the portion of agricultural produce needed for the due cultivation of the land until the next harvest and for the support of the judgment debtor and the debtor’s family is exempt from attachment or sale. The quantum is fixed by the State rather than by the executing court, which is the difference between Section 61 and clause (b) of the Section 60 proviso, where the Court forms its own opinion on what cattle and seed-grain a livelihood requires.
Notice under Order 21 Rule 37 against a warrant for arrest
On a money decree the executing court must ordinarily issue a show-cause notice instead of a warrant, and a warrant at the first step is the exception the proviso to Rule 37 allows. Rules 37 to 40 of Order 21 set out that sequence, and each rule adds a condition that has to be satisfied before the next step becomes available.
The sequence is easier to hold as four gates than as four rules. Rule 37 decides whether the judgment debtor is called or seized. Rule 38 controls what a warrant may direct. Rule 39 is a payment the decree-holder must make before any arrest happens, and Rule 40 is the inquiry that decides whether detention follows.
Missing a gate is not an irregularity that later compliance cures. In the 2025 ruling in Nizam Sheikh v. Alimuddin the Delhi High Court held that arrest and detention cannot follow automatically from non-payment, and that the executing court must record its reasons and its satisfaction on the statutory conditions before ordering either. The fuller treatment of arrest and detention under the CPC sets out the surrounding provisions.
The show-cause notice under Rule 37 against a warrant for arrest at the first step
Rule 37(1) opens with words that displace the rest of the Order. Where an application seeks execution of a money decree by the arrest and detention of a judgment debtor who is liable to be arrested, the Court “shall, instead of issuing a warrant for his arrest, issue a notice calling upon him to appear before the Court on a day to be specified in the notice and show cause why he should not be committed to the civil prison”. The obligation is expressed as “shall”, and the alternative it displaces is named in the same breath.
The proviso supplies the only route to a warrant at the first step. Notice is unnecessary where the Court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that with the object or effect of delaying execution the judgment debtor is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction. Two things must be shown together, the flight and the object or effect of delaying execution, and a decree-holder’s assertion that the debtor has been evasive establishes neither.
Rule 37(2) deals with the debtor who ignores the notice. Where appearance is not made in obedience to it, the Court shall, if the decree-holder so requires, issue a warrant for the arrest of the judgment debtor. A warrant at this stage follows a default in obeying the Court, which is why it does not need the abscondence finding the proviso requires.
Section 135(3) closes a gap the notice would otherwise open. A judgment debtor attending court to show cause why he should not be committed cannot claim the exemption from arrest under civil process that Section 135(2) gives to parties, pleaders and summoned witnesses. Obeying a Rule 37 notice therefore carries no immunity for the hearing it summons the debtor to attend.
Subsistence money under Rule 39 against the arrest inquiry under Rule 40
Rule 39(1) is a bar on arrest rather than a direction about costs. No judgment debtor “shall be arrested in execution of a decree unless and until the decree-holder pays into Court such sum as the Judge thinks sufficient for the subsistence of the judgment-debtor from the time of his arrest until he can be brought before the Court”. Until that sum is deposited, no arrest may take place at all.
The obligation continues through the detention. Where the judgment debtor is committed to the civil prison, Rule 39(2) requires the Court to fix a monthly subsistence allowance on the scales fixed under Section 57 or, where no scales have been fixed, by reference to the class to which the debtor belongs. Rule 39(3) requires that allowance to be paid by the party who applied for the arrest, monthly and in advance, before the first day of each month.
Rule 39(5) then settles who ultimately bears that money. Sums disbursed by the decree-holder for the judgment debtor’s subsistence are treated as costs in the suit, and its proviso adds that the judgment debtor shall not be detained or arrested on account of any sum so disbursed. A decree-holder cannot turn the cost of imprisoning a debtor into a fresh ground for imprisoning the same debtor.
Rule 38 sits between the warrant and the inquiry. Every warrant of arrest must direct the officer executing it to bring the judgment debtor before the Court with all convenient speed, unless the amount ordered to be paid, together with interest and any costs, is sooner paid. Arrest under Order 21 is a means of producing the debtor before the court, and not a sentence that begins at the moment of seizure.
Rule 40(1) sets the order of the inquiry, and that order is the part most often reversed in practice. When the judgment debtor appears in obedience to a Rule 37 notice, or is brought before the Court after arrest, the Court shall first hear the decree-holder and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the application for execution, and shall then give the judgment debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to the civil prison. The decree-holder leads and the judgment debtor answers, which means a court that opens by asking the debtor to explain the default has inverted the rule.
The same rule then gives the Court three possible outcomes. Rule 40(2) allows the Court, pending conclusion of the inquiry, to detain the debtor in the custody of an officer of the Court or to release him on security for his appearance. Rule 40(3) allows an order of detention subject to Section 51 and the other provisions of the Code, and its proviso permits the Court to leave the debtor in an officer’s custody for a period not exceeding fifteen days first, so that the decree can be satisfied. Rule 40(5) requires the Court to disallow the application and direct release where no detention order is made, while Rule 40(4) preserves the power to re-arrest a debtor released under the rule.
The Section 51 means test against the absolute bars on arresting a judgment debtor
The proviso to Section 51 allows a court to order detention only on one of four findings recorded in writing, and three further provisions bar detention whatever those findings are. Section 51 itself lists the modes of execution: delivery of property specifically decreed, attachment and sale or sale without attachment, arrest and detention in prison for a period not exceeding that specified in Section 58, appointment of a receiver, and such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require. The modes of execution under the CPC are set out there in full.
Arrest is one mode among five, and it carries a condition none of the other four carries. The proviso, inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, requires the Court to give the judgment debtor an opportunity of showing cause and then to be satisfied, for reasons recorded in writing, of one of the four matters set out in it.
That requirement came from an international obligation India had already taken on. Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “no one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation”, and in Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin the Supreme Court read the proviso in that light.
The passage from that judgment is the one still quoted: “The simple default to discharge is not enough. There must be some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the past or, alternatively, current means to pay the decree or a substantial part of it.” The warrant in that case had issued under Section 51 and Order 21 Rule 37 with no inquiry into the debtors’ ability to pay, and the Court set it aside.
The four findings and the Explanation that reads the attachment exemptions into them
The four findings are alternatives, and any one of them is enough to support an order. The Court must be satisfied that the judgment debtor, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying execution, is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction; or has, after the institution of the suit, dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property or committed any other act of bad faith in relation to it; or has, or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay the decretal amount or a substantial part of it and refuses or neglects to pay; or is liable under a decree for a sum for which he was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account.
Only the third finding turns on money, and it has two elements that must be proved together. Means and refusal are cumulative, so evidence that the judgment debtor once had money does not answer the question unless it is coupled with a refusal or neglect to pay. The proviso fixes the window as means held “since the date of the decree”, which excludes money the debtor had while the suit was pending and lost before judgment.
The Explanation to Section 51 then does the work these two halves of the topic are rarely read together for. In calculating the means of the judgment debtor for that third finding, any property which is exempt from attachment in execution of the decree is left out of account. The Section 60 proviso therefore operates twice on the same facts: once to keep property out of the decree-holder’s hands, and again to keep it out of the arithmetic that decides whether the debtor is imprisoned.
The effect is sharpest where a judgment debtor’s only assets are a provident fund balance and the exempt portion of a salary. A court applying the Explanation then has nothing left to count, and the third finding cannot be made however large those assets happen to be. Nizam Sheikh v. Alimuddin states the same point from the other direction, holding that physical fitness or a capacity to earn does not by itself establish that the debtor presently has the means to pay.
A separate line of authority governs decrees that are not for money, and the two are often confused. In Bhudev Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, decided in 2025, the Supreme Court dealt with detention under Order 21 Rule 32 for disobedience of an injunction decree, and held that imprisonment is a drastic step requiring a recorded finding of wilful disobedience despite an opportunity to comply. Rule 32 and the means test under the Section 51 proviso answer different questions, and an answer that cites one for the other has taken the wrong route through the Order.
The bars on arrest that no finding can cross
Section 56 is absolute in its terms, and it opens by overriding everything else in that Part of the Code before stating its rule: “the Court shall not order the arrest or detention in the civil prison of a woman in execution of a decree for the payment of money.” There is no inquiry, no discretion and no exception for means. The bar holds however strong the findings under the Section 51 proviso would otherwise be, and it applies to the order of arrest as well as to the detention.
Section 58 fixes a floor and a ceiling. No order of detention may be made at all where the total amount of the decree does not exceed ₹2,000. Where the amount exceeds ₹2,000 but not ₹5,000, detention may not exceed six weeks, and where it exceeds ₹5,000, it may not exceed three months. Several States have amended these figures, so the local amendment is checked before the period is calculated.
Release does not wipe out the decree, and it does not expose the debtor a second time. Section 58(2) provides that a judgment debtor released from detention is not discharged from the debt merely by reason of the release, but is not liable to be re-arrested under the decree in execution of which he was detained. The decree-holder keeps the debt and loses the arrest route on that particular decree.
Section 55 controls the manner of an arrest that is otherwise lawful. No dwelling house may be entered after sunset and before sunrise; no outer door may be broken open unless the house is in the judgment debtor’s occupancy and the debtor refuses or prevents access; and where a room is in the occupancy of a woman who by custom does not appear in public, the officer must give her notice that she is at liberty to withdraw, allow her a reasonable time and reasonable facility to do so, and only then enter. A further proviso requires the officer to release the judgment debtor at once where the decretal amount and the costs of the arrest are paid on the spot.
Sections 135 and 135A exempt certain persons from arrest under civil process altogether. Section 135(1) protects a Judge, Magistrate or other judicial officer going to, presiding in or returning from court, and Section 135(2) protects parties to a matter, their pleaders and agents, and summoned witnesses, while going to, attending and returning from the tribunal. Section 135A protects members of Parliament and of State legislatures during a sitting of the House or of a committee, and during the forty days before and after such a meeting, sitting or conference, with liability to re-arrest once that period ends.
Frequently asked questions
How many heads does the proviso to Section 60 CPC actually exempt?
The proviso exempts twenty heads, although its lettering runs only from (a) to (p). Clauses (ia), (ka), (kb) and (kc) were inserted by later amendments without renumbering the rest, so counting letters gives sixteen while counting heads gives twenty. The heads are what an executing court applies.
Can a judgment debtor agree to give up the exemption in a loan document?
An agreement of that kind has no effect at all. Section 60(1A) provides that an agreement by which a person agrees to waive the benefit of any exemption under Section 60 is void, and it says so notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force. A waiver covenant in a loan or guarantee document therefore adds nothing to what the decree-holder could reach without it.
Is the whole salary of a judgment debtor exempt from attachment?
Only part of a salary is protected, and the protected part is fixed by a fraction rather than by a ceiling. On an ordinary money decree, clause (i) exempts the first ₹1,000 and two-thirds of the remainder, so a salary of ₹36,000 yields ₹24,333 exempt and ₹11,667 attachable. On a decree for maintenance, clause (ia) exempts one-third of the salary instead, which leaves two-thirds available to the decree-holder.
Can a woman be arrested in execution of a money decree?
A woman cannot be arrested or detained in civil prison in execution of a money decree. Section 56 provides that notwithstanding anything else in that Part of the Code, the Court shall not order the arrest or detention in the civil prison of a woman in execution of a decree for the payment of money. The bar operates without any inquiry into means and without exception.
Must the executing court issue a notice before a warrant under Order 21 Rule 37?
The executing court must issue a notice in the ordinary case. Rule 37(1) requires the Court, instead of issuing a warrant, to issue a notice calling on the judgment debtor to show cause why he should not be committed to the civil prison. The single exception is in the proviso, where the Court is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that the debtor is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction with the object or effect of delaying execution.
What is the maximum period of detention in civil prison under Section 58 CPC?
Three months, and only where the decretal sum exceeds ₹5,000. Where it exceeds ₹2,000 but not ₹5,000, the maximum is six weeks, and where the total amount of the decree does not exceed ₹2,000, no order of detention may be made at all. Several States have amended these figures, so the applicable State amendment is checked before the period is fixed.
References
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (sections cited: 47, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 135, 135A, and Order 21 Rules 37, 38, 39 and 40)
Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976
Provident Funds Act, 1925; Public Provident Fund Act, 1968; Pensions Act, 1871
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 11
Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360
Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance, (1976) 3 SCC 607
Radhey Shyam Gupta v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 1 SCC 376 / AIR 2009 SC 930 (Supreme Court of India, 4 November 2008)
Bhudev Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 INSC 175 (Supreme Court of India, 17 January 2025)
Nizam Sheikh v. Alimuddin (High Court of Delhi, 8 April 2025)
Chuni Lal v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 112 (High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh)
Mekathoti Yesupadam v. Tamada Ratna Kumari, CRP No. 2296 of 2024 (High Court of Andhra Pradesh, 11 March 2026)
Disclaimer
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are subject to State amendments, and the monetary limits in Section 58 in particular vary between States. Readers should consult a qualified advocate on the facts of a specific execution proceeding.