This coming term, in Wassily v. Blanche, the Supreme Court will decide whether asylum beneficiaries are barred from obtaining lawful permanent residency if their asylum status has been terminated. Wassily is of considerable significance. While the termination of asylum status once was relatively uncommon, recent policy changes by the Trump administration have exposed far more immigrants to the risk of this.
The legal dispute in Wassily, which has divided the federal courts, dates back to unclear language in the Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act laid the framework for the modern asylum system and defined legal standards for asylum officers, immigration judges, and other immigration adjudicators. The act used precise, detailed language in crafting the refugee process for noncitizens outside of the United States, but Congress left internal asylum procedures more undefined, with less statutory guidance. Over time, asylum claims increased dramatically, making unclear statutory gaps more and more troublesome.
Indeed, that lack of statutory clarity is front and center in Wassily. The Refugee Act specified that refugees processed outside the United States could only obtain a permanent resident green card if their refugee “admission has not been terminated.” By contrast, the act was unclear whether that same requirement also applied to asylees who had obtained asylum status from within the United States. For asylees applying to “adjust” to permanent resident status, as codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), the Refugee Act did not mention termination at all. Instead, the act only said that the immigration official “may” grant the green card for “any alien granted asylum” who met the admissibility requirements. The act did not say whether “granted asylum” meant anyone who previously had been granted asylum or whether that phrase was limited to those with a current asylum status.
Tamer Wassily left his native Egypt and entered the United States in 1993. He was granted asylum in 2000 based on his claim of persecution in Egypt as a Coptic Christian. Later, he was convicted of stalking and child endangerment, at which point the DHS sought to terminate his asylum status before an immigration judge. The immigration judge agreed and terminated this based on the finding that Wassily’s stalking conviction was a “particularly serious crime.” But the immigration judge found him eligible to adjust to a green card because the immigration statute did not contain “an explicit requirement” of current asylum status.
Byron Velasquez Arreaga entered the United States in 1995 and was granted asylum. He later was convicted of multiple crimes for driving while intoxicated. The DHS sought to terminate his asylum status and scheduled an immigration court hearing. The immigration judge terminated his asylum status for particularly serious crimes. In contrast to Wassily’s immigration judge, this immigration judge found that without a current asylum status, Velasquez Arreaga could not adjust status to a green card and he was ordered removed to his native country of Guatemala.
The parties appealed both cases. The Board of Immigration Appeals weighed in on the statutory confusion in a precedent decision: Matter of T-C-A-. The BIA interpreted the statute as meaning that only a noncitizen with current asylum status could adjust to permanent resident status. In Wassily’s appeal, the BIA relied on Matter of T-C-A-. It found that Wassily’s terminated asylum status made him ineligible for adjustment to a green card. The BIA also found Velasquez Arreaga ineligible for adjustment.
In tandem cases for Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits that only noncitizens with current asylum status were eligible for asylee adjustment. The 2nd Circuit concluded that the statutory phrase “granted asylum” was best understood to require a current asylum “status” – a legally significant term as used by Congress. The panel majority said its reading was “buttressed” by statutory context, including the Immigration Act of 1990. That act explicitly created a time-restricted exception that allowed some noncitizens to apply for green cards “regardless of whether or not such asylum has been terminated.” The circuit reasoned that this limited exception, as a “statutory note,” did not create a general rule that noncitizens could apply for permanent residency after termination.
In dissent, Judge Beth Robinson adopted the minority view of the circuits on this “difficult” statutory question. She reasoned that the asylee adjustment statute meant that “any” noncitizen was eligible to adjust who previously had been granted asylum. Under Robinson’s view, the absence of the word “status” from the statutory provision must have been an intentional omission by Congress.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in June to review the statutory question of whether terminated asylees are eligible to apply for adjustment to permanent residency. In their petition for certiorari, Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga argue that the statutory text and context are clear that any noncitizen who was “granted asylum” previously can seek permanent residence after termination. They interpret “granted” as a past tense verb, and they contend that the omission of “status” in the statutory language must be given effect because Congress knew how to include such a requirement.
As broader statutory context, Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga emphasize the adjacent Section 1159(c), which allows for a discretionary “waiver” of other requirements for the noncitizen’s admissibility. According to them, it would be “strange” to interpret the statute as “categorically” stripping the attorney general of that discretionary authority where the asylee’s status has been terminated.
Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga also invoke the rule of lenity – the canon that a statutory ambiguity should be construed in favor of the noncitizen. They claim that lenity is especially paramount after the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, which eliminated the doctrine of Chevron deference to a federal agency’s (here, the BIA’s) reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
In an atypical move where only the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Circuits so far have looked at this issue, Solicitor General D. John Sauer agrees that the Supreme Court should grant review. Even so, the solicitor general maintains that the 2nd Circuit was correct in interpreting asylee adjustment as limited to noncitizens with current asylum status. The government says that Congress’ intent is best understood as giving effect to the termination of asylum “status” as a bar to obtaining a green card. The solicitor general relies on the statutory note in the Immigration Act of 1990 as evidence that Congress only excepted a small subset of asylees from the general rule barring terminated asylees from adjustment of status.
Without citing Loper Bright, the government disputes that the rule of lenity is applicable here at all. The solicitor general argues that the discretionary waiver at Section 1159(c) does not undermine the most natural reading of asylee adjustment because “the decision to terminate is itself discretionary” and the court should give effect to that waiver authority.
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The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case could impact the interests of the millions of asylum applicants with cases pending in the immigration courts and asylum offices, as well as those persons granted asylum status in recent years. Even if the Supreme Court narrowly frames this case as a discrete statutory question, it will clarify the effect of the government’s termination authority for anyone granted asylum. This is especially timely: in December 2025, the DHS announced that it would “comprehensively re-review” asylum approvals from “high-risk” countries since entry in 2021. At the end of that review, the DHS could elect to terminate asylum status. In June 2026, a federal district court vacated the DHS re-review policy, but the government is challenging that ruling.
That’s not all. The case also could have broader implications for federal administrative law if the justices take an interest in the parties’ arguments about the government’s discretionary authority or Loper Bright. The Supreme Court has not yet relied on Loper Bright in deciding an immigration case. In fairness, the 2nd Circuit found no need to do so, and the Supreme Court avoided a similar issue in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, a case that concerned the judicial standard of review for asylum “persecution” determinations. But that does not mean the court will continue to let this issue linger.
Disclosure: When he was at the DOJ, the author litigated Wassily before the 2nd Circuit. He no longer has any involvement in the case or its litigation before the Supreme Court.