A court order directing someone to furnish a bond is not the same as a bond that has been executed. The Allahabad High Court has drawn this line in a case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“the Act”). It held that a bond directed under Section 19(3) of the Act cannot be treated as breached or forfeited, and its amount cannot be recovered, unless the bond was actually executed. Mentioning ₹50,000 as the bond amount in an order does not turn that sum into a liability that can be recovered automatically.
The High Court did not question the Magistrate’s power to require a bond under the Act. It dealt with a narrower defect: a recovery warrant issued for the amount of a bond that had never come into existence.
Background of the Case
The dispute arose from an application under Section 12 of the Act, read with Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20, filed by the revisionist’s wife. It was registered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 11554/2023 (Neelam Pundeer vs Kapil Dev Pundeer) before the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division)/Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 5, Ghaziabad.
By order dated 03.06.2025, the Trial Court directed the revisionist, Kapil Dev Pundeer, to furnish a personal bond of ₹50,000. He was also to give an undertaking that he would not commit any violence against his wife and minor child while the case was pending.
The revisionist challenged this order in an appeal under Section 29 of the Act before the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court No. 2, Ghaziabad. The appeal was dismissed on 29.04.2026, which affirmed the Trial Court’s order of 03.06.2025.
The matter did not end there. By order dated 18.08.2026, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 6, Ghaziabad, issued a recovery warrant against the revisionist on the ground that he had breached the undertaking. The revisionist’s case was that he had admittedly never furnished the bond or the undertaking. In his submission, there could be no breach of something that was never executed, and the recovery warrant therefore could not have been issued on that ground.
He approached the High Court through a criminal revision. The prayer was to set aside the appellate order dated 29.04.2026 and the Trial Court’s order dated 03.06.2025. The revision came with a delay condonation application, as there was a delay of 28 days in filing it. The Court found the cause shown sufficient, condoned the delay and allowed that application before taking up the revision.
Before deciding, the High Court by order dated 09.09.2026 called for an explanation or report from the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 6. It wanted to know whether any provision permits a personal bond from the respondent while proceedings under the Act are pending. It also asked whether a recovery warrant could legally be issued against the respondent when no breach of a bond had occurred. The Magistrate submitted a report in compliance.
Question Before the Court
The central question was whether a bond that was ordered but never executed can be treated as breached, forfeited and then recovered under the Act. The related question was whether the amount stated in an order directing a bond can be recovered as a monetary liability against the person who was directed to execute it.
The revisionist argued that without execution there could be no breach. Counsel for opposite party No. 2 and the learned A.G.A. relied on Sections 19(3) and 23(2) of the Act, which they said allow a Magistrate to require a bond to prevent domestic violence, including where there is a likelihood of the respondent committing it. They also accepted that no specific provision prescribes a procedure for issuing a recovery warrant where there is no breach of a bond. Their answer was Section 28(2) of the Act, which they said lets the Court lay down its own procedure.
Statutory Framework
The High Court treated three provisions of the Act as relevant: Sections 19(3), 19(4) and 28(2). It read them together with Section 446 of the Cr.P.C., which corresponds to Section 491 of the BNSS.
Section 19(3) empowers the Magistrate to require the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. The Court recognised this power and did not dispute it.
Section 19(4) provides that an order under Section 19(3) is deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Chapter IX of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) and is to be dealt with accordingly. The Court used this as the link between the Act and the general law on bonds. A bond ordered under the Act is not left to a free-standing mechanism. The Act itself sends it into the Cr.P.C./BNSS machinery.
Section 446 Cr.P.C./Section 491 BNSS supplies the procedure once a bond has been forfeited. As the Court described it, once the Court is satisfied that a bond has been forfeited, it must record the grounds of that satisfaction. It may then call upon the person bound to pay the penalty or to show cause why it should not be paid. If sufficient cause is not shown and the penalty is not paid, it may be recovered as if it were a fine imposed by the Court. The Court may also, for reasons recorded, remit any portion of the penalty and enforce payment in part only.
Section 28(2) provides that nothing in sub-section (1) prevents the court from laying down its own procedure for disposing of an application under Section 12 or under Section 23(2). This was the provision the respondents relied on to justify the recovery warrant.
When Can a Bond Be Forfeited?
The Court’s reasoning rests on the distinction between an order directing a bond and a bond that has actually been executed. Its analysis of the statutory chain shows that forfeiture proceedings presuppose a series of steps, each depending on the one before.
1. Actual execution of the bond. Forfeiture operates on a bond. Where an order under Section 19(3) is followed by the respondent actually executing the bond, the consequences of a later breach are dealt with under the statutory mechanism for forfeiture. Without execution, there is nothing to forfeit.
2. Subsequent breach of its conditions. The Court spoke of a situation where the respondent has executed the bond and “subsequently commits a breach of the conditions thereof.” Breach is therefore measured against a bond that already exists and binds the respondent.
3. Judicial determination of forfeiture, with reasons. The Court held that the amount in the bond does not become automatically recoverable merely upon an allegation of breach. The Court must first consider and determine the alleged breach and record the grounds on which the bond is found to have been forfeited.
4. Opportunity to pay the penalty or show cause. The person bound must be given an opportunity to pay the penalty or to show cause against payment. The Court may also, for reasons recorded, remit the whole or part of the penalty and enforce payment accordingly.
5. Recovery only thereafter, if legally permissible. Only if sufficient cause is not shown and the penalty remains unpaid may the amount be recovered in accordance with law, as if it were a fine.
The Court’s conclusion was that the procedure for forfeiture and recovery under Section 446 Cr.P.C./Section 491 BNSS “would necessarily presuppose the existence of an executed bond and its subsequent forfeiture in accordance with law.” An unexecuted bond cannot enter this sequence at all.
Section 28(2) Cannot Override the Forfeiture Procedure
Counsel for opposite party No. 2 and the A.G.A. conceded that no specific provision prescribes a procedure for issuing a recovery warrant where there is no breach of a bond. They argued that Section 28(2) fills the gap by letting the Magistrate devise his own procedure.
The High Court rejected this on the facts of the case, and its reasons were specific.
- Section 28(2) does not by itself provide an independent basis for treating the amount of an unexecuted bond as a recoverable monetary liability. A power to regulate procedure is different from a power to create a liability that the substantive scheme does not recognise. The Court’s concern was not with procedure for deciding the application, but with the conversion of a bond amount that was only specified in an order into a sum owed.
- Section 28(2) cannot be read to dispense with the statutory requirement governing forfeiture of a bond that has been duly executed. The Court pointed out that Section 19(4) itself specifically provides that an order under Section 19(3) is to be dealt with under Chapter VIII of the Cr.P.C./Chapter IX of the BNSS. A general power to lay down procedure cannot displace that specific direction. In other words, the Act has already said how bond-related orders are to be handled, and Section 28(2) cannot be used to bypass it.
The Court thus treated Section 28(2) as a power over how an application is disposed of. It did not treat it as a way to avoid the forfeiture mechanism or to attach money liability to a bond that was never executed.
Allahabad High Court’s Findings
Applying this reasoning, the Court noted that the revisionist’s specific submission was that he had not furnished or executed the bond or undertaking directed on 03.06.2025. That submission, the Court recorded, had not been disputed.
On that footing, the Court held that without execution of the bond there could be no question of forfeiture for breach of any of its conditions. The ₹50,000 mentioned in the order of 03.06.2025 represented the amount of the bond that was required to be executed. Merely because it was specified in the order, it could not be treated as a sum automatically recoverable from the revisionist.
Accordingly, the Court held that in the peculiar facts of the case, where the revisionist had admittedly not executed the bond or furnished the undertaking, the question of breach and consequent forfeiture did not arise. The issuance of a recovery warrant for the bond amount of ₹50,000 therefore could not be sustained.
Final Directions
The Court did not stop at setting the recovery aside. The revisionist’s counsel stated that he was now ready and willing to furnish the personal bond of ₹50,000 along with the undertaking directed by the Trial Court on 03.06.2025. He also asked that the proceedings under the Act be directed to be concluded within a stipulated period.
Considering this statement, the Court issued the following directions:
- Time to furnish the bond: The revisionist was granted twenty days to furnish the personal bond of ₹50,000 along with the undertaking in terms of the order dated 03.06.2025.
- Expeditious disposal: The Trial Court was directed to make every endeavour to conclude the proceedings arising out of the Section 12 application expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of the order. It was to afford adequate opportunity of hearing to all concerned and to avoid unnecessary adjournments.
- Future breach: The Court clarified that if the revisionist commits any breach of the conditions after executing the bond, the consequences are to be dealt with strictly in accordance with the law governing forfeiture of the bond, after following the prescribed procedure.
With these observations and directions, the criminal revision was disposed of.
Conclusion
The judgment is a reminder that a bond-related liability has a defined legal sequence. A Magistrate may require a bond under Section 19(3), and the Act routes such orders into the Cr.P.C./BNSS framework through Section 19(4). That framework operates on a bond that has been executed, breached and then forfeited by a reasoned judicial determination, with the person bound given a chance to pay or show cause. Only after that can recovery follow, as if the penalty were a fine.
An order that merely specifies a bond amount does not create a sum payable. Section 28(2), the Act’s provision on procedure, cannot be used to skip these steps. Execution and lawful forfeiture must come before any recovery.
The ruling also leaves the protective purpose of the order intact. The revisionist was given twenty days to furnish the bond and undertaking, the Trial Court was asked to decide the main application preferably within six months, and any future breach after execution remains open to action through the proper forfeiture procedure.
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